

**INTIFADA & THE BLOOD OF ABRAHAM.  
“LESSONS IN ASYMMETRICAL  
WARFARE--WRITTEN IN STONE”**

**A MONOGRAPH  
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
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
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## **ABSTRACT**

**The Blood of Abraham, "Intifada, Uprising & Lessons in Asymmetrical Warfare" by Major David A. Brown, United States Army, 70 pages.**

A historical case study concerning the Israeli Army's response to the Palestinian "Intifada" or uprising in the late 1980's and early 1990's provides instructive planning considerations for likely future application of U.S. military force in an asymmetrical threat environment. The monograph specifically analyzes the time period from the beginning of the uprising until the handshake of Rabin and Arafat on the White House lawn September 13th, 1993.

Although the theoretical application of the case study is speculative of future environments, this paper attempts to link available historical data to anticipated trends in the international security environment and emerging concepts of operational art. The argument surrounding asymmetrical types of warfare leads into a discussion of the application of IDF lessons learned that may be applied to future U.S. military scenarios.

Areas of analysis include:

- 1) Background, nature and growth of the Intifada Palestinian uprising
- 2) The Israeli civil-military relationship
- 3) The effectiveness of tactical coercion methods employed by the IDF in its efforts to use conventional military force in an unconventional manner (including the linkage, or lack of it, between strategic ends, operational level army planning and tactical training/execution within an asymmetrical environment)
- 4) Applicable lessons that might be drawn from the IDF experience

Specific conclusions include:

- 1) Recognition of the difficulty of fighting a protracted asymmetrical conflict
- 2) Likelihood of American forces facing a similar threat in the future
- 3) Limitations of military coercion — particularly in representative democracies
- 4) Military force superiority can be offset by protracted commitment and nationalistic sentiment
- 5) Successful campaign strategies depend on inclusion of all instruments of power available to the nation — particularly the use of diplomatic leverage
- 6) Point of diminishing returns on technological solutions in an unconventional or asymmetrical environment
- 7) Need for operational planning and integration for operations other than war



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## **I. Introduction**

These are the sons of Abraham: Isaac, and Ishmael. These are the sons of Ishmael: Twelve [Arab] princes according to their nations. These are the sons of Isaac: Esau and Israel.

1 Chronicles 1:28, 34 & Genesis 25:16 <sup>1</sup>

In December of 1987 two seemingly unrelated minor events in Gaza suddenly produced a popular uprising of Palestinians against Israeli occupation that had enormous impact on the nation of Israel and the near Middle East region, as well as the Israeli-Palestinian and Arab-Israeli peace processes. Palestinian leadership did not plan this uprising or *Intifada*. It began spontaneously and quickly gained wide spread support that led to a protracted maelstrom of violence and frustration over several years.

Today the Middle East remains an enigma for much of the Western World. It is a place of great contrasts and deep passions. While many things have changed with modern life, many things still seem to reflect eons gone by. A young boy steps into the path of a car, the car slows and as it does Palestinian youth step out of the brush heaving stones at the car and knocking out the front windshield. The Jewish driver, personally enraged, charges off after the boys with a rifle out of his trunk, and is unexpectedly brought up short by the scene he is confronted with.

Down the path trudged three Palestinian women dressed in long black robes and beating two dozen sheep with canes. It was a scene straight from the Bible or Koran, the shepherdesses and their flock walking past mud huts framed in palm trees and cactus plants. It easily could have been 1888, or 1288, or 1088 BC. Nothing much had really changed since the days of Isaac and Ishmael — not the stones and certainly not the passion; only the car and the fancy rifle were new. <sup>2</sup>

The bitter path of modern conflict between Abraham's seed seen today in both Arab Palestinian and Jewish Israeli is crisscrossed with deep ruts of hurt and frustration and baked over several decades into the hard dry land the world knows as Palestine or Israel.<sup>3</sup>

Like the American Army today, the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) of the late 1980's and early 1990's was a highly successful, technologically advanced army, capable of difficult and complex conventional warfare operations. Its superior capabilities and even its rich combat experiences in conventional warfare were not, however, able to overcome the asymmetrical nature of a popular uprising of civil disobedience which the Palestinian Intifada represented. This new threat encompassed all strata of Palestinian society and was firmly rooted by a broad-based grassroots support. In addition widely dispersed Palestinian leadership made this threat very difficult for the IDF to confront directly. Unlike a conventional warfare scenario it became very difficult to define who the enemy was, and even more difficult to identify the leaders behind it.

American military planners and strategists are currently expecting a future integrated U.S. military force structure to be able to conduct a broad range of activities stretching across the possible spectrum of the employment of military forces. This spectrum ranges from large scale high tech combat operations against a peer competitor, through security operations designed to deter regional powers, to serving as a protection force for humanitarian assistance efforts being conducted by the UN, local governments, or non-governmental organizations, (NGOs).

One of the issues a future U.S. military force is likely to confront is the issue that challenged the IDF during a protracted popular Arab uprising in the late 1980s. The IDF

was "the" regional military power — a superior technological force adept at conventional warfare suddenly faced with waging a protracted, unconventional, asymmetrical war.

Arguably the U.S. military will face few if any true peer competitors on the battlefield over the next ten to fifteen years. Much more probable is the prospect of facing unconventional forces with few if any major military capabilities. If that proves to be true, then striking parallels can be drawn for future operational planning by examining the IDF's experience confronting a similar protracted unconventional asymmetrical threat one decade ago.

This monograph attempts to extract those lessons by examination of the historical example of Israel in the late 1980's and early 1990's. The IDF had prepared to face a conventional force on force military threat, but instead found itself confronted with rocks, local civil disturbances and terror over a sustained time frame. How the Israeli Army responded to this threat at the operational level (i.e. planned and used military force towards the attainment of strategic objectives), in a constrained or less than full scale war environment, provides valuable lessons that could serve the U.S. military well as we approach the twenty-first century. Major areas of analysis will include:

- 1) The background, nature and growth of the Palestinian uprising;
- 2) The dynamic interaction between Israeli civil and military authorities (for example, the impact of Israeli political policy on the use of military force against non-military targets for the attainment of political ends. Corollaries to this are the impacts of military actions on political policy making, and Israeli society's impact on the conduct of military operations);

3) The effectiveness of tactical coercion methods employed by the IDF in its efforts to use conventional military force in an unconventional manner (including the linkage, or lack of it, between strategic ends, operational level army planning and tactical training/execution within an asymmetrical environment);

4) Applicable lessons that might be drawn from the IDF experience.

## **II. Intifada Case Study**

### **A. Background (Leading up to 1987)**

For they have sown the wind, and they shall reap the whirlwind.  
Hosea 8:7 <sup>4</sup>

Since the emergence of the Israeli State in 1948, Palestinian leadership sought to “liberate” Palestine from the occupation of the Jewish people. In support of that goal, an organization named Fatah emerged in the 1950’s as an anti-Israeli guerrilla organization, and then at an Arab conference in 1964 the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) was established to act as the official representative of the Palestinian people. <sup>5</sup> These two organizations were primarily centered in the Egyptian controlled Gaza strip on the Mediterranean coast of Palestine. <sup>6</sup>

The major turning point for Palestinian aspirations was the 1967 Arab-Israeli war. <sup>7</sup> In light of Israel’s demonstrated military capability, PLO leadership felt it was no longer feasible to defeat Israel with conventional forces. The 1967 war brought nearly one million Arabs under Israeli control. <sup>8</sup> The PLO concluded that future armed struggle with Israel would have to rely more on popular support and unconventional means (primarily

guerrilla tactics and terrorism) instead of conventional military forces mainly provided by Arab states. This became an "increasingly attractive strategic approach" to many Palestinian Arabs seeking total liberation of Palestine from "Zionist" control. Over time however the goal changed to the establishment of secular, democratic state in Palestine. As opposed to their earlier goal of the outright destruction of Israel as a state, this position moved them towards a more realistic goal with statehood still foremost important, but with Jewish settlers included. Eventually the PLO reassessed their strategy and by 1974 had decided to push for the establishment of a Palestinian State in the West Bank and Gaza, leaving the question of Israel's existence ambiguous.<sup>9</sup>

For the PLO then, the struggle took on a protracted nature borrowing heavily from Mao's political writings on populous-based war strategy.<sup>10</sup> Heightened awareness of the longevity of such a struggle led several PLO factions to enhance political maneuvering with increasing acts of violence<sup>11</sup> in the hope of furthering Palestinian aims in a quicker manner. Geographic constraints and PLO organizational factions, however, hindered such a strategy. The geography of Palestine did not easily lend itself to the traditional type of successful insurrection where large vegetative regions with poor transportation infrastructure (like South East Asia) assisted in maintaining secure bases of operation that were difficult for governmental forces to interdict. Partly resulting from this geographic limitation, which made secure bases in Israel nearly impossible, PLO leadership remained splintered and geographically based out of several Arab countries, (until the PLO would set up a "state within a state" in Lebanon).

Not being based in Palestine, however, contributed to the PLO's focus being splintered over widely divergent Palestinian concerns, not only the concerns of Palestinians living within Gaza and the West Bank, but also the concerns of those living in Jordan, Egypt and other Arab states. Those groups of Palestinians living outside of Palestine often had dissimilar political goals from the Palestinians living in the Israeli occupied territories. And it was these "Israeli Palestinians" who would ultimately commence the uprising known as the Intifada.

Israel attempted to cope with PLO acts of terrorism by stiff legal sentences against Arab offenders balanced with an overall effort to "liberalize" normal relations with Arabs living in Israel or the occupied territories, as long as they agreed to abide under Israeli law. This attempt to "co-op" Palestinian Arabs living in Palestine was enhanced by the fact that economic conditions were better for many Israeli Palestinians (especially in the West Bank) than for those in Egypt and Jordan. This Israeli "you're better off with us than against us" strategy was somewhat successful in preventing the PLO from gaining too much popular support for "armed civil-disobedience" in the occupied territories. As a result, there was limited civil disobedience in the territories for Israel to have to deal with. Israel continued to deal with outside terrorist infiltrations across Israeli borders with aggressive patrolling, security barriers, and military strikes against guerrilla base camps operating outside of Israel. Terrorist activities, although continually problematic, remained somewhat sporadic and, therefore, as far as Israel was concerned, the entire "Palestinian problem" as a major issue seemed to be largely contained by the early

1970's.<sup>12</sup> This resulted in a somewhat *laissez faire* attitude in the IDF concerning the possibility of (or preparation for) a Palestinian popular uprising.

Although the Israeli strategy for dealing with the PLO and the "Palestinian issue" as explained above seemed sound and successful in dealing with the Palestinian issue in the 1960's and 70's, four factors particularly undermined the overall strategy. The first factor was growing Israeli frustration with terrorism that resulted in unexpected "Jewish" civilian violence against innocent Arab civilians. Although Israeli crackdown on illegal Jewish activities and making public "examples"<sup>13</sup> in the courts of those Jews who were involved in violence against Arab civilians helped stem this trend, the legacy left increased bitterness and hostility on both sides.

The second factor also stemming from frustration over outside terrorism was the election of a harder line government (Likud) in the late 1970's. This administration "ushered in an era of regressive counter-insurgency policies which among other things, involved a less discriminate use of force and [an increase in] collective punishments which in turn, increased Palestinian resentment and thus contributed to the Intifada in 1987."<sup>14</sup>

A third factor was the hard-line political stance of the newly elected Likud party that totally rejected any suggestion, by Arabs or by other Israeli political parties, of trading "land for peace." This hard line stance concerning land negotiations with Palestinians did not change even after Israel signed a peace accord with Egypt in 1979. In a effort to emphasize its total commitment to this policy, the Likud government greatly expanded Israeli settlements, particularly in the West Bank (where Palestinian aspirations for a land settlement still existed). This greatly increased Palestinian frustration and over time



helped squelch any hopes “Israeli Palestinians” had for a land settlement in Gaza or the West Bank.

A fourth factor that undermined the relatively firm control that Israel had over the West Bank and Gaza formed over a long period of time and was specific to Israeli Palestinians. That factor is known as “Perceived Relative Deprivation.”<sup>15</sup> The economic infrastructure of the West Bank and Gaza was completely dependent on Israel, and whereas many Palestinians were employed in Israel, most were employed in menial labor at low wages. The relative nature of their perceived deprivation came about from continual contact with Israelis. Palestinian perceptions were not relative in comparison with how much better off they were than Palestinians in surrounding countries, but in comparison with how much worse off they were than Israelis in the same country. As Palestinian desires rose about improving their own economic status, there was not a corresponding increase in their possible economic achievement capability, which significantly contributed to rising Palestinian frustration.

Several conditions aided in this perceived deprivation. Israeli counterparts earned higher pay for similar work, so although there was some consolation in their general economic situation relative to Jordanian and Egyptian Palestinians, it was worse than the population they lived along side. This was exasperated by demographics which show that seventy five percent of the population of the West Bank and Gaza are under the age of thirty and were the most likely to be affected by rising unemployment.<sup>16</sup> Secondly, a generally higher standard of living over time had assisted in higher educational standards, which in turn fueled higher expectations of employment opportunities as well as civil

rights. The third condition was a lack of political and social freedom. Palestinians perceived that their political and social freedoms were curbed, especially in the wake of Israeli security measures. Random searches of Palestinian homes, for example, were necessary and prudent security precautions to the Israelis, while to the Palestinians were construed as daily harassment and humiliation.<sup>17</sup>

Another example of the curbing of Palestinian rights was the legal mockery of "due process" as a security measure. Since the evidence against "security" offenders (a broadly encompassing charge) was normally collected by the *Shin Bet* through covert wiretaps and informers, the accused were not charged with specific crimes and their lawyers could not review the "evidence" against them. The Israelis claimed this was done in order to protect important sources, but it resulted in the Palestinian portion of the population not being treated equally under the law.<sup>18</sup> In essence, because of these and other curbing of civil rights, Palestinians saw themselves in Israel as second class citizens, which continued to fuel an ever-growing sense of bitterness and frustration.

In addition to the above internal conditions undermining the stability between Israel and Israeli Palestinians, external factors also contributed to the outbreak of violence in 1987. The major external factor was the sense that Arab leadership and world leaders were deserting the Palestinian cause. Particularly keen to the Palestinians was the growing marginalization of the PLO, (partially due to the Israeli success against them in Lebanon), and specifically how that marginalization relegated the "Palestinian Issue" to a low priority during the Arab summit meeting, at Amman, in November of 1987.<sup>19</sup> On the very eve of the uprising, the only issue of grave concern to the Palestinians (that of

Palestinian Statehood) was virtually ignored at a major Arab summit. This contributed greatly to the feeling that Palestinians living in the West Bank and Gaza had been “abandoned” and would need to take things “into their own hands” in order to achieve progress with Israel. <sup>20</sup>

Finally, in setting the stage and that led to the Intifada, the Israeli war in Lebanon played its own role in contributing to later Palestinian actions. In a foreshadowing of things to come, while many conventional military goals had been met, there was the lack of a corresponding political solution in Lebanon. In addition, although the IDF gained some experience in Lebanon with unconventional warfare, they derived no real doctrine for immersion in an unconventional environment. Writing three years prior to the uprising, Richard Gabriel made this prediction,

The IDF must learn to deal with various levels of low-intensity conflict. These may range from demonstrations to rock throwing to bombings and sniping. Yet to be considered by the IDF is the type of force to develop for such a purpose. An ancillary problem is to determine what tactics are acceptable and, probably more important, what limitations are to be placed on military activities. The IDF may face these problems most specifically on the West Bank. <sup>21</sup>

As one writer points out, in an ironic twist, the very success that Israel achieved conventionally against the PLO in the Lebanon war (practically destroying them and driving them out of Lebanon) actually contributed to the initiation of the Intifada. Israeli blows to the PLO leadership in Lebanon helped marginalize the PLO in Arab circles and thereby indirectly sparked additional Palestinian resentment over their lost cause. <sup>22</sup>

In summarizing the major historical factors leading up to the Intifada in 1987, first and foremost there was a deep and long standing Palestinian frustration with the Israeli

occupation. This included increasingly unmet expectations of Palestinians living in Israel and their strong feelings of social, economic and political discrimination. Added to this was the Palestinian fear of no foreseeable political solution to their dream of statehood, along with feelings of anger and despair at perceived Arab and world abandonment. In visiting Israel in 1988 to assess the crisis of the Intifada, a Presidential Study Group on U.S. Policy in the Middle East made the following observations concerning its causes.

The Palestinian uprising can be traced to many factors, some more immediate, some longer-term; social, economic and political forces all came into play. However, the fundamental cause of the "revolution of the stones" is unquestionably political: deep Palestinian frustration with the continued Israeli military occupation of the West Bank and Gaza, with the lack of concern in the Arab world, and with the ineffectiveness of the PLO or any other external party to end the occupation. <sup>23</sup>

"And so for twenty years the play went on: Palestinians talking to the world about resistance, even resisting individually, but resigning themselves as a community to the Israeli system; Israelis talking to the world about their "enlightened" occupation, and then doing anything they had to, behind closed doors, to keep the Palestinians quiet." <sup>24</sup> On the 8th of December 1987 that silence shattered.

#### **B. Nature and Growth of the Uprising**

The Israeli National Tourist Bureau canceled an advertisement it was running in Dutch newspapers that said Tel Aviv and Jerusalem were only a "stone's throw" apart.

-News item in USA Today, February 18, 1988 <sup>25</sup>

On the 6th of December 1987 a Jewish shopper in a Gaza marketplace was stabbed to death by an unknown assailant. Two days later at 4:00 p.m. on 8 December 1987, a

careless Israeli semi-trailer truck driver turned onto the crowded main road leading into Jabaliya, a large Gaza refugee camp. The driver ended up hitting several vehicles, killing four Palestinians and wounding seven others (all of which were coming from their jobs in Israel).<sup>26</sup> A spark suddenly ignited a fire of accusations as rumors spread throughout the camp that this Israeli had purposefully swerved into the oncoming lane of traffic to avenge the murder of 6 December. Some told that he was the slain man's brother, others - his cousin. What was "clear" to most Palestinians after twenty years of frustration, heightened by recent anger over the marginalization of Palestinian aspirations, was that this was no accident.

Early on the following day, a group of Palestinian youth threw rocks at a truck full of reserve Israeli soldiers, who in turn chased them around the camp on foot. When they returned to the vehicle it was surrounded by angry Palestinians. Two burning bottles were thrown at the vehicle, and in the fear and commotion surrounding the situation, the Israeli officer in charge shot his weapon twice at a seventeen year old Palestinian - killing him. A massive riot involving as many as 30,000 Palestinians broke out in Gaza that evening when the IDF tried to gain the body for an autopsy. Israeli checkpoint soldiers were overrun by the rioters. Friedman describes the birthing pains:

Armed with bottles, rakes, stones, and tree limbs, [they] devoured the army's tear-gas grenades and rubber bullets, which seemed only to nourish their rage. Israeli soldiers said they heard shouts of "Itbach al-yahud" -- murder the Jews. By the next day, Thursday, December 10, 1987, the nearby town of Khan Yunis joined in the demonstrations, then the Balata and Kalandia refugee camps in the West Bank, then small Palestinian villages and city neighborhoods: there were more confrontations with Israeli troops, more casualties, and more burning tires smudging the skies of the West Bank and Gaza for days on end. Before anyone knew it, virtually all the Palestinians

under Israeli occupation were engaged in a spontaneous primal scream that would be heard around the world.<sup>27</sup>

"Intifada" was thus born. For the purposes of this monograph the term Intifada shall refer to not only the Palestinian portion of the uprising but the Israeli responses to the uprising during the time period (primarily 1988 - 1990) as well. Therefore, "Intifada" will be construed in the popular usage of applying this word to the entire Israeli-Palestinian interaction, which concerns both the Palestinian popular uprising itself as well as Israeli reactions to it.

In understanding the nature of this confrontation, the first step is understanding why the Palestinians themselves named their uprising an "Intifada," because it helps portray the very nature of the Palestinian grievances. The Palestinians of Gaza and the West Bank were no longer just plain Palestinians, but more distinctly — Israeli Palestinians. They were beginning to see their identity ignored by the rest of the world and see themselves drowning in all that was really Israeli — Israeli power, Israeli rule, Israeli control over every aspect of their lives. It is important to see here that they didn't name the uprising a "*thawra*," which is the Arabic word for revolt or revolution. It is even more surprising since this word was in fact a cry in the streets of Beirut by PLO guerrillas; "*thawra, thawra, hat al-nasr*" — revolution, revolution, until victory.<sup>28</sup> Instead they named their uprising "*Intifada*" or Intifadah.

Intifada in Arabic literally means "tremor, shudder or shiver." Even more enlightening, the root of this Arabic word means to "shake, to shake off, shake out, dust off, to shake off one's laziness, to have reached the end of, be finished with, to rid oneself of

something, to refuse to have anything to do with something, to break with someone.”<sup>29</sup>

By naming the uprising Intifada rather than Thawra, the Palestinians were showing that they did not see themselves “first and foremost, as *overthrowing* Israel as much as purifying themselves of ‘Israeliness,’”<sup>30</sup> and thereby demonstrating their ownership and control over their own lives and destinies. This helps make sense of why the Palestinians would, in the beginning, shut down shops and impose commercial strikes (that if anything were more harmful to the Palestinians than to the Israelis), without issuing any demands.

In continuing to dissect the nature of this confrontation, the next step is to understand the asymmetrical and unconventional quality of the armed struggle. The term asymmetrical has two general meanings. In one sense asymmetrical refers to warfare between two uneven conventional forces, such as a larger armed force against a smaller or a less well equipped armed force. The second meaning denotes an unconventional sense as when an armed force finds itself arrayed against an “unarmed” force. The unarmed force can also be composed of civilians instead of irregular military forces. The term “unarmed” also deserves definition, in that this force may be demonstratively violent or problematic, and may use weapons such as knives, rocks, and even small arms or home-made grenades or bombs, yet still be considered “unarmed” in the sense of not being a viable threat to a fully armed conventional military force. The term asymmetrical does not apply to the stakes or feelings on either side of the conflict, which can be felt just as deeply on either side. In other words, the asymmetrical force imbalance does not necessarily represent the degree of commitment or will power on the part of the force that is weaker militarily.

The Intifada uprising is historically asymmetrical in the second or unconventional sense. The IDF was, and is, a potent modern well-equipped conventional military force - one to be reckoned with on the conventional battlefield. The problem was that there was no enemy in a "conventional" sense. The IDF was facing "unarmed" civil-disobedience, old men brandishing sticks, women and teenagers - even children throwing stones, shouting, participating in public disturbances, rioting and occasionally resorting to individual use of gasoline or "petrol" bombs, all of which are normally considered "insignificant" in a conventional military sense. In February 1989, Rabin reported that "sixty percent of the stone-throwers in the Territories are children aged 14-16."<sup>31</sup>

The immediate question that arises out of such an asymmetrical cauldron concerns the effective use of force by a modern army to counter such a situation. Armies by their nature have been described as blunt instruments, (besides having obvious administrative capabilities), because of the nature of destruction they are capable of unleashing. The level of response can be incredibly high, but as modern war theorists are apt to point out, particularly in representative democracies, there are normally constraints on the "proper" use of military coercion, beyond which the society is unwilling to sanction. In other words, there seems to be a societal threshold of "fair" response. For example, should retaliation for stone throwing rationally result in, for instance, artillery barrages? The answer, at least for representative democracies, seems to be no. As some writers have pointed out this can actually become a disadvantage for an army involved with what in some ways constitutes a "policing" issue. Although the IDF was a well equipped, modern industrial Army, "massive firepower and mobility are not nearly as decisive in [low-



intensity war] and may even be a disadvantage.”<sup>32</sup> Furthermore, in such a situation a “conventional configured army must relinquish the initiative as to time and place of attack to an enemy that can hit at the time and place of its own choosing.”<sup>33</sup>

In further consideration of the nature of the “Intifada,” understanding the spontaneous quality of the uprising is important. There was no plan promulgated by the PLO or local Arab leaders to organize a popular movement against Israel. One day there was no uprising, albeit still local frustration and passion, the next day a wave of violence, rioting and collective spirit began to spread rapidly through out the territories. Many sources cite the fact that not only was Israel caught off guard by this turn of events, but that the PLO was equally surprised. This had implications for all sides. For the Israelis, the resulting mindless sort of violent explosion of rage by the Palestinians was 1) difficult to understand and did not lend itself to normal analysis, and 2) resulted in an uncertainty as to what to focus on. The PLO, although not displeased, was left scrambling for influence to turn the situation to its own advantage. The Israeli Palestinians, who collectively started this popular rebellion, were in a sense as startled as any of the parties involved. This led logically to the next aspect of the nature characterizing the Intifada.

The aims of the participants, particularly the “antagonists” in this case, were limited. In fact, in the beginning, the Palestinians had *no* aims. The uprising began in spontaneous anger, frustration and resentment, but without goals, without aims, without even aspirations. As one man observed, it was an “uprising of anger more than having a purpose. At the beginning, it had no purpose or aims. It started just like that.”<sup>34</sup>

However, as the power of the popular uprising caused serious problems for the Israeli

state, the PLO and local Palestinian leaders were quick to see the potential opportunity to provide political direction to the civil disturbances and advance their own agendas. The scope of the conflict began to grow. The growth generally occurred in two areas. The first area was the steady growth of PLO and Palestinian direction in shaping desired political outcomes. The second area was the progressive variety of tactical methods the IDF worked through to deal with the conflict.

By the sixth week of the conflict, a group of Palestinian intellectuals and local leaders, with PLO prompting had formulated and presented to the international press a list of fourteen demands in the name of "Palestinian nationalist institutions and personalities from the West Bank and Gaza."<sup>35</sup> This action began to give political direction to the aimlessness of violence being acted out in the territories. By this time ten or more Palestinians had been killed, hundreds wounded, over a thousand arrested, and at least four deported. These demands included removal of various restrictions and discrimination policies, cessation of settlement activities, cancellation of certain taxes, release of arrestees, return of deportees, removal of Israeli personal/forces from the West Bank and Gaza, and a call for "free municipal elections under the supervision of a neutral authority."<sup>36</sup> Others contend that even though a group stepped forward with this list of demands, it was almost a year before those who would really sit down with Israeli officials representing the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza would describe any clear objectives accompanying their "stones and bottles."<sup>37</sup> Although the demands were mostly unchanged, they now represented a broader consensus of popular support from

the Palestinians that had been crafted through political speeches, leaflets and robust activist engagement in Gaza and the West Bank over time.

The underlying nature and growth of the Intifada are essential to understanding the conflict. Understanding the growth of the conflict is the simpler of the two in context. Over time the growth of the conflict is seen specifically in 1) more sophisticated Palestinian political direction and leadership, 2) the progressive growth of IDF tactics to quell the violence, and 3) the growing magnitude of the uprising's influence both in Israel's political process and in an increase of world attention, particularly in the United States.

Understanding the total nature of the conflict is made more complicated by many underlying issues. However, the essential nature of the conflict as an asymmetrical conflict between army and populace never changes. To more fully develop the nature of this conflict, proper consideration must be given to the perspectives of each side, which will be accomplished in the next two segments of this study.

Interestingly, the Intifada conflict is particularly characterized by limitations and disequilibrium between the use of political and military instruments of power on both sides. In terms of limitations there is purposeful limited resistance on the Palestinian's side and purposeful limited response on the Israeli side. This disequilibrium is best seen in the fact that the Palestinians are primarily making a political statement while the Israelis are primarily countering with a military solution. The discussion of these conflicting perspectives and their continuing influence on the nature of the Intifada will be explored in the following segments on Palestinian and Israeli perspectives.

### **C. Palestinian Perspectives**

Come, and let us cut them off from being a nation; that the name of Israel  
may be no more in remembrance.

Psalms 83:4 -7 <sup>38</sup>

Although the hyperbole of the quotation mirrors the earlier cries of the PLO from 1948 until 1987, as has been pointed out previously, this was no longer the primary intent of Israeli Palestinians. From their perspective, they were living “under occupation” in their own territories, and they didn’t intend necessarily to over-throw the Israeli government. In the beginning there does not seem to have even been any clear political aims. Once those aims were actually decided upon and articulated, the core Palestinian issues emerged quite clearly: renew the visibility of the Palestinian plight upon the world stage, improve social and political freedom, and continue movement towards an autonomous Palestinian governance of the territories.

Of particular note is the maturity of their uprising from a practical standpoint. For years the PLO had used and advocated terrorism or guerrilla tactics, but Israel had remained unmoved. Now the citizens of Gaza and the West Bank were making a pragmatic assessment of useful limitations. They intentionally limited the amount of resistance (primarily out of fear of Israeli reprisals). Although fueled more by pragmatism than a coherent strategy, the result ended up limiting the ability of the Israelis to response beyond certain levels (and as will be discussed later in the paper, placed the Palestinians in the hitherto unknown position of underdog). That this positive result came about by happenstance makes no real difference, the point here is that they knew what would not

work. By primarily using “stones instead of firearms” the Palestinians were advocating the position that their “most powerful weapon was not terrorism or guerrilla warfare, which had been practiced futilely for twenty years, but was massive non-lethal civil disobedience.”<sup>39</sup> What violent armed struggle could not achieve, civil disobedience accomplished.

When prompted by journalists as to why they threw stones, Palestinian youth did not respond with high sounding ideology but with pragmatism; “because we don’t want to face Israeli tanks.”<sup>40</sup> Prime Minister Shamir is reported as saying that if firearms were used widely in the uprising; “there would not be even a memory of them left.”<sup>41</sup> From various first hand reports in the occupied areas, Palestinians were all too aware of the limitations that the IDF operated under as long as they did not escalate the conflict into conventional war. They knew that as long as they threw stones that the Israelis would “respond with largely — though by no means exclusively — proportional measures: sporadic gunfire, imprisonment, tear gas, and plastic bullets.”<sup>42</sup> Although these measures themselves would occasionally result in Palestinian deaths, it was not the norm and was certainly not enough to dissuade Palestinians from mass participation in the uprising. Thus, from a Palestinian perspective, purposeful limited resistance imposed an unconventional asymmetrical nature upon the conflict, which in turn forced the Israelis to limit their response in a proportional manner.

Stones may not have been the weapons of choice in the PLO arsenal but who can argue with success (even limited ones). Where terrorism had failed for years to move Israel towards concession, stones were succeeding in forcing Israel to face the Palestinian

issue head on. For the first time in twenty years the Israelis were truly off balance and caught in a catch-22 of sorts. Arafat and other PLO leaders immediately saw the incredible possibility of a role reversal in the media from Israel as the oppressed underdog standing alone against Arab hatred, to the Palestinians as the oppressed underdog from the brutality of Israeli state sponsored terror. The PLO could not have scripted the outcome any better themselves, and PLO leadership immediately encouraged the continued use of stones for sound operational reasons that could be easily exploited for propaganda purposes.<sup>43</sup>

By mid 1988, the Palestinians had essentially adopted three methods of resistance with the Israelis; 1) violent demonstrations of mainly youth, marching, chanting and throwing stones or other more lethal objects like gasoline grenades, 2) smaller groups and individuals throwing rocks at traffic consisting primarily of Israeli commuters, and 3) commercial strikes of Palestinian businesses in the territories.<sup>44</sup> These efforts were also heavily supported by an informal "information" campaign or paper war in the form of leaflets, that over time helped shape the uprising's ideological goals and encouraged compliance and cooperation among the Palestinian populace.<sup>45</sup> This low-tech informal information campaign continued through the majority of the Intifada and was surprisingly effective.

In the first several months of the conflict the Palestinians were euphoric with accomplishment. They had disrupted the status quo, refocused world attention on the Palestinian issue, and successfully resisted the occupation, proving they could stand up to Israel. A possible catalyst to feeling like they could in fact stand up to the Israeli army

may have occurred in November 1987 and now referred to as the “hang-glider incident.” Two motorized hang-gliders near the Lebanese border had landed on the Israeli side of the security zone. One Palestinian entered the military base by which he had landed and proceeded to kill six and wound seven Israeli soldiers before being killed himself. This “incident” was widely proclaimed in the territories of the West Bank and Gaza as “a heroic operation . . . which destroyed the myth of Israeli defenses.”<sup>46</sup>

This new attitude that the IDF could be successfully challenged was also reinforced by the common Palestinian interpretation that another indigenous Arab civilian population had helped force the IDF’s withdrawal from Lebanon.<sup>47</sup> For all of these reasons, early in the uprising, Palestinians felt powerful in the success they had achieved. As one study group looking at the Intifada issue later put it, “even if their fortunes were reversed by Israeli counter-measures, the Palestinians would not be deprived of this sense of achievement.”<sup>48</sup>

A disequilibrium, spoken of earlier, began to form between the two opposing sides. While the Palestinians were primarily making a political statement, the Israelis were primarily responding with a conventional military solution. As will be shown in the next section, although the Israelis’ analysis of the situation was one needing to be primarily addressed by diplomatic, economic or informational instruments of power, their initial analysis was driven by the need to find an immediate solution to a security issue (primarily through the IDF). In other words a solution that primarily involved the use of the military as a instrument of national power.

#### **D. Israeli Perspectives**

Yet a remnant of them shall return.

Isaiah 10:22 <sup>49</sup>

From the Israeli perspective, security was always the central issue. The Jews had indeed “returned” to their ancestral land in 1948 (as they saw it), and for twenty years they had struggled to remain there — constantly fighting against a concerted effort to throw them off of it. A certain amount of common paranoia, rooted in the reality of their struggle for national survival, had become a way of life and was deeply imbedded in the Israeli national psyche. When the Intifada began in December 1987 it seemed that this was just another security problem that could be handled the way these things were normally handled, with firm tough resolve — a show of force and the problem would be solved at least temporarily. However, the Israeli government failed to see the *political* nature of the problem and therefore initially turned the problem completely over to the military to discharge — and to discharge rapidly. But as the Intifada grew over months to take on the nature of a protracted struggle, a serious debate began on all sides as to how to deal with the issue.

The debate that was launched in Israel concerning how to deal with the Intifada was closely connected to an underlying issue of the larger long-standing debate about whether Israel should ever “trade land for peace” in or out of the territories. Labor (pro) and Likud (con) roughly split the electorate and remained divided on the issue. Prior to the 1973 War the surrounding Arab countries were not interested in any such trade, while from 1974 -



1981 Israel was consumed with the Egyptian peace process, followed in turn by the Lebanon war, the ensuing departure from Lebanon and the struggle to revitalize the country's economy.<sup>50</sup>

Once it became evident that the problem was more than a passing irritant, indignant self-righteous frustration manifested itself within Israeli society, along side that of the Palestinians' bitterness. Many Israelis felt like a Jewish "homeowner who woke up one morning with the live-in [Palestinian] maid standing in the master bedroom playing the stereo full blast and announcing that she is no longer a faceless object to be ordered around, but an equal — with an equal claim to the house."<sup>51</sup> What about the medical care, the better living conditions [than other Palestinians], and the good jobs that were provided by the Israeli economy? From Israel's perspective, these people were ungrateful for all Israel had done for them, and they should be put back in their place. One Israeli taxi cab driver may have captured a larger, common sense of frustration when he replied to how Israel should respond to the uprising by saying; "you know what we should do? We should take our clubs and hit them over the head, and hit them and hit them and hit them, until they finally stop hating us."<sup>52</sup>

### **1. Initial Israeli Analysis**

The most important aspect of the initial analysis that needs to be understood is that Israel did not anticipate the uprising at all. As a society Israel was "shocked, surprised, and caught off guard by the uprising, and as in the early days of the 1973 war, they were shaken by the realization that the existing order was not as stable as they had assumed."<sup>53</sup>

The Army was caught as "unaware" as anyone else was. In fact, less than two months before the outbreak of Intifada, the general in charge of Israel's Central Command told a press conference that very few West Bank Palestinians had been involved in anti-Israeli violence. He went on to state that "the limited extent of public participation and the varying styles of attack over the years indicate that there is no clear-cut trend towards spontaneous popular resistance, and did not reflect a long-term trend towards a popular uprising."<sup>54</sup>

In the very beginning it is almost as if, while the population was somewhat taken back, the government and the IDF essentially make no concerted effort at analysis. The government and the military essentially took the position that the "natives are restless again," assuming that the unrest would quickly blow over.

As time passes Israeli leadership slowly reached the conclusion that the Intifada was not going to "blow over." In this second stage, Israelis, in a sense, viewed the disturbances totally different from the perspective of outsiders who tended to see the Intifada as a civil uprising. The Israelis did not view this as a civil uprising but as a war by another name, specifically an extension or new stage of the on going forty-year war for Palestine.<sup>55</sup> As late as 1989, Prime Minister Shamir addressing an American Jewish audience in the United States declared, "make no mistake about it, what you see are not demonstrations. They are not sit-ins. It is not civil disobedience. It is war — a war against Israelis, against the existence of the State of Israel."<sup>56</sup> Understanding this helps throw light on the reason that the government immediately sought a military solution to the problem.

As the Intifada continued and appeared to engulf the occupied territories, the Israeli government formulated a crackdown policy. It wanted to prevent the Palestinians from achieving even marginal success. Any negotiations from such a situation would appear as weakness on the Israeli side. Israel concluded that it could not be seen as having been forced to the negotiation table.

The Intifada's success in causing instability in the occupied territories placed Israel in just such a position of weakness. Therefore negotiation was out of the question until the uprising was quelled, presumably it was thought, through military means. Labor, who was in power when the uprising began, advocated a policy of "violence containment" through riot control, arrests and detentions. The government also barred Palestinian workers from Jerusalem and Tel Aviv, interrupted telephone communications from the West Bank and Gaza, and forced some Arab business to remain closed — all in an effort to slowly diffuse the situation.<sup>57</sup> Likud, (who won the next election largely due to popular dissatisfaction of Labor's dealing with the uprising), favored sterner policy measures for dealing with the crisis that entailed more coercion from the IDF. The uprising itself, however, had "undercut the rationale of what had been the Likud position all along — that the status quo in the territories could be sustained at low cost to Israel."<sup>58</sup>

Within six months, several broad areas of consensus seemed to form among Israelis. Two of these directly affected the role of the Army. The first was a general agreement that a political solution would eventually be needed. This was offset, however, by a second point that had a direct impact on the use of the IDF and force within the territories. The second point was that the IDF must restore order quickly so that Israel

would not enter negotiations from a position of weakness.<sup>59</sup> Political policy seemed to be frozen, so the military's task was to wear down the uprising in what became a protracted struggle of wills. The following quotation aptly summarized the overall Israeli perspective (which differed from the Palestinian perspective given earlier) and the resulting challenge.

The Palestinian uprising, which began on December 9, 1987 and has continued unabated, is a violent struggle against Israeli rule and by the Arab population in the Territories and East Jerusalem, and to a lesser degree by the Arab minority inside Israel. It is a large-scale insurrection, including civil disobedience, which is intended to secure independence. The uprising is in fact a war against Israel by a large population, although it is not a conventional war because of "limitations on the use of force" that do not apply in normal warfare.<sup>60</sup>

## **2. Israeli Army Responses**

Once the massive demonstrations began, the IDF looked on the situation initially as "business as usual." Statements from the Army indicated that the IDF would "remove the gloves," put some refugee camps under curfew, close a few schools for a couple of weeks, and round up some PLO activists, all of which were somewhat successful in the past. This they asserted would allow the demonstrators to "cool off" and then these "incidents" or "troubles" would "pass in due course."<sup>61</sup>

Several months into the uprising, after the Palestinians had frustrated most IDF attempts to deal with it, outspoken senior Army officers emphasized the fact that the entire problem ultimately required a political, not a military solution. They went further to admit candidly that, institutionally, the IDF's ethos had "no room for the role of

policing a restive civilian population, and no desire to undertake a mission that would only weaken its capacity to carry out its principal task — deterring external threats to Israel's security.”<sup>62</sup> Ill content to act in a limited police type function with little hope of operational success, Army leaders, (although obedient to orders and committed to quell the uprising), seemed reluctant for their forces to “fire on, beat up, or otherwise ride herd on civilians.”<sup>63</sup> What was certain was that the role of the Army was going to be highly politicized and debated in Israeli society. And no matter what the army accomplished it was very unlikely to satisfy either the right or the left. Over time, the Army in fact did come under increasing pressure to escalate the use of force in the territories as the Intifada and its accompanying frustrations wore on.

Because many officers argued that “policing” was not the core technical task of the army,<sup>64</sup> a proposal surfaced to pass the job over to the Border Police, the rationale being that the Border Police as an institution was better trained and equipped for such a task.<sup>65</sup> In earlier years the ratio in the territories of border police to soldiers was one to two, or one to three. Some in the IDF began to argue for a ratio as high as one soldier to one border policeman.<sup>66</sup> Others in the IDF argued that although better trained for such conditions, the Border Police had a track record of less restraint and that their heavy handedness may have actually helped trigger the uprising. The IDF felt caught between conflicting interests. As one source stated, “on the one hand, we are responsible for the territories — on the other, we have serious reservations about involving our soldiers in the necessary evils of occupation.” Reflecting the experience with the Lebanese population another commented that, “we are just beginning to get Lebanon out of the Army and I

don't want to think about having to do it again.”<sup>67</sup> Already, by January 1988, Rabin was advocating a policy of “might, power and beatings” to quell the unrest. The administration claimed that this would save lives and was an alternative to the use of live ammunition.<sup>68</sup>

One problem in using the Army was that, for the most part, the IDF was still unaccustomed to anything but conventional military solutions (like air and artillery attacks, turning movements and deep penetrations) which have little effect on guerrilla forces.<sup>69</sup> However, these type of military solutions, although possible in limited fashion chasing guerrillas in Lebanon, were even harder to implement on Israeli soil. Certainly prior to the war in Lebanon, “almost all Israeli battle experience had been with large-scale units in conventional wars against enemies configured in conventional ground-force patterns. Israelis had no experience fighting guerrilla forces, particularly those integrated in an urban population.”<sup>70</sup>

As was alluded to earlier, the immediate question that arises out of such an “unconventional” asymmetrical cauldron is how to use a modern army to effectively counter such a situation. Again, an Army is naturally inclined to bring overwhelming force against an opponent, but there are normally constraints on the “proper” use of military coercion beyond which the society is unwilling to extend. The concept of fair or “proportional” response is difficult to determine. What methods would accomplish the mission, i.e. quell the violence in the territories, without resort to overwhelming destruction that would cross the boundary of national and international toleration? The IDF was a force that was dangerous to stand up to, toe to toe, face to face and slug it out

with, but as the situation changed into an unconventional asymmetrical confrontation, its advantages in firepower and battlefield mobility no longer guaranteed success.

In addition, conventional forces always seek to maintain the initiative which was now relegated to those in the uprising who choose when and where to provoke conflict. It was difficult to wrest back the initiative from the Palestinians because there seemed to be little leadership to target. Rabin himself asserted that there was “no organized command or logistic structure” for the Intifada and that its leadership “acts on the spur of the moment and makes use of whatever comes to hand.”<sup>71</sup> After dealing with the Intifada for some period of months, the IDF came to realize that the decentralized nature of the uprising’s leadership made it more resilient, and prevented the use of a single blow to destroy it the way that conventional forces most often planned to defeat an enemy.

As has been pointed out earlier, because the Palestinians were choosing the time, place and level of violence (limited forms of resistance), the IDF had to conform to that reality. What that meant was that the use of limited resistance by the Palestinians forced the IDF away from conventional strengths to a policy of limited responses against an asymmetrical enemy.

The types of limited responses employed by the IDF may have been unsettling to western news watchers but the responses were still limited in light of the magnitude of armed warfare the IDF was capable of conducting. Even had the IDF been willing to ignore western sensitivities and push the boundaries on coercive actions beyond that considered humane by other groups, their own society held them in check. This is

inherent in a representative democracy with its built in systems of checks and balances.

The IDF's repertoire of available tactical options was restricted to a limited number.

The nature of the IDF, and the moral tie it retains to the nation of Israel, limited their military response when the IDF was faced with this unconventional threat. As pointed out by Richard Gabriel, the French used special operations involving terror and even executions effectively in the Algerian war,<sup>72</sup> but the "IDF's own moral code of war" limited its ability to retaliate to civilian attacks against it. In one writer's opinion, the IDF, in Lebanon, "consistently refused to raze villages, burn houses, torture civilians or otherwise take revenge on the civilian populations which sheltered terrorists who struck at Israeli forces."<sup>73</sup> During the Intifada, the IDF did expand their repertoire of tactics to include the destruction of civilian homes and other punitive measures (specifically examined in the next section) in an attempt to deal with the uprising. Yet the full strength of the military was never able to be brought to bear on the issue. And as another writer put it, "there is nothing so frustrating than feeling you are strong but that you cannot use your strength."<sup>74</sup>

#### **a. Methods and Tactical Execution**

##### **1) Successes & Failures**

Although the amount of force was somewhat limited in terms of overall IDF capability in conventional terms, this did not mean that coercive methods of violence were not used by the IDF. There did seem to be some logical progression in trying to determine



what would and would not work. Note should be made that the methods themselves are mostly tactical in nature, especially in the beginning. As was stated earlier, the Rabin government had decided that force was necessary to ensure that the Palestinians did not “win” by using the tactics they were employing. In setting such a policy the first attempts at coercion primarily revolved around beatings and general use of force. According to Rabin, the army’s objective was “to bring about calm and lower violence to a reasonable level.” Other members of the Israeli Cabinet stated that it was “the army’s task to restore order, period.”<sup>75</sup> It was, however, Rabin’s view that carried the day.

Amnesty International began to chronicle to the press and Western governments what it considered human rights violations. Amnesty International claimed that the government’s policy had given virtual license to IDF forces for indiscriminate violence, particularly beatings. What was particularly disturbing to groups both in and out of Israel was the growing evidence that this did not preclude bystanders — including women and children. Hospital reports seemed to corroborate excessive broken limbs, fractures and extensive bruising reportedly from soldier’s clubs and rifle butts.<sup>76</sup>

More severe actions were reported and protested by various groups to include allegations of various forms of information extraction and torture of detainees. Be that as it may, ill treatment (or allegations of such) is debated on both sides as to what is true and to what extent. However, those actions that constituted the major portion of Israeli counter-tactics, including their success and failings can be summarily examined.

#### **Military Efforts:**

- Road blocks
- Show of force in larger and more permanent postings
- Dispersing demonstrations
- Psychological and information operations
- New technologies: (aerial surveillance, vehicle mounted rock throwers)
- Riot equipment: (protective equipment, riot batons)
- Rubber bullets, tear gas, and plastic bullets
- Exile/deportations
- Curfews

#### **Legal Efforts:**

- Trials, imprisonment, fines
- Administrative detention

#### **Efforts Against Societal Structures:**

- School/shop closings
- Shutting off phone services and electricity
- House demolitions

The correlation between the show of force by larger military forces and decreased violence seems to be born out in Israel's experience with the uprising. Fewer forces meant thinner coverage of problem areas and resulted in the uprising's increased momentum and intensity. The use of larger numbers of forces is one of the few ways to maintain presence and thereby take some initiative away from the Palestinians. Almost always successful when employed the IDF used this technique whenever possible, but the numbers of troops required to maintain a large presence across such a wide area soon took its toll. Israel did not have the manpower to maintain this particular tactic much more than in periodic surges. What seems to be clear is that when utilized, large military or police presence seems to have had calming effects on the levels of violence. Shalev maintains in his analysis that the commitment of forces on a large scale is therefore an essential measure to perform in this type of environment.<sup>77</sup> Dr. Larry Cable, an expert on

insurgency and counter-insurgency warfare, supports this view, stating that "presence and not firepower is the most effective means of coercion." <sup>78</sup>

Along with maintaining as many soldiers in the territories as possible, the IDF experimented with breaking up rioting groups. Dispersing demonstrations or rioters by force was a technique that involved rushing a group from the flank or rear, if possible to scatter them. Although effective in some cases for mass demonstrations, it had no effect on smaller groups throwing stones and/or gasoline grenades at military formations. <sup>79</sup>

Little is available in Israel's use of psychological operations (psy ops) and the use of an IDF information campaign primarily because the IDF has classified most such activity. One source indicates that Israel attempted to combat the Palestinian information campaign by distribution of fake leaflets in an effort to sow confusion and doubt in the local population. <sup>80</sup> However, considering the volume and frequency of the Palestinian leaflet campaign by various groups, it is highly unlikely that much success came through this method. In addition, the difficulty of distribution is evident with a population that is used to manual circulation by hand to hand and from neighbor to neighbor. In many ways, the more technological reliant an opponent, the easier to effectively wage subversive information operations against them. In this case the opposite was true.

The IDF also experimented with new technologies. These included aerial photography sub-dividing Palestinian living areas into manageable sections for patrols or observation, observation posts with enhanced night vision devices and low-visibility cameras, and new anti-riot control equipment on IDF vehicles. Machines were fielded to hurl stones, clusters of pebbles and hard rubber balls at rock throwers and crowds.

Riot equipment, including protective clothing and appropriate shielding, was not available in great quantities early on but this was short lived. IDF soldiers were soon patrolling the West Bank and Gaza territories with adequate protective equipment. A month into the uprising, governmental policy changed to allow for a much wider use of the riot baton when confronting rioters. This engendered a more aggressive approach in dealing with demonstrators, and while the initial directives constrained their use to "violent" demonstrators, their abuse was widely increased in a new policy that called for beating protestors. In compliance, many IDF soldiers, weary of the conflict, began regularly venting their own frustrations on demonstrators. The intent was to break hands and feet, and not hit demonstrators in the head.<sup>81</sup> Palestinians casualties ran high and many abuses resulted in death. Initial indicators showed temporary success and the installation of fear within the local populace. This was quickly reversed over time as fear was transformed into rage and increased hatred among Palestinians for IDF forces. Overall any deterrent effect was short lived.<sup>82</sup>

Rubber bullets, tear gas and plastic bullets all had their limitations. Rubber bullets were ineffective at ranges greater than twenty meters until they were improved with the addition of lead making them somewhat more effective at greater ranges. Tear gas was difficult to use due to rioters wearing scarves, and shifting winds that would sometimes blow the gas back onto the IDF soldiers. Plastic bullets were introduced to gain longer ranges for effective dispersal of demonstrations. When fired at legs, the bullets acted as a useful deterrent and Shalev documents a decrease in demonstrators throwing gasoline grenades once they were put into use. The problem was that even at seventy meters

plastic bullets proved fatal when striking the head (or the chest at shorter distances). By June 1989, eighty-two fatalities were already attributed to plastic bullet use.<sup>83</sup> One Palestinian counter-tactic seemed to be an increase of children throwing stones — out of a somewhat accurate belief that the IDF would resist firing plastic bullets at them.

In summary, of the strictly military tactical methods covered above, Shalev maintains that “not even the use of all the material and ordnance described proved sufficient to stop the uprising. The primary [successful] component is the use of large forces accompanied by a variety of tactical measures. It seems unlikely that any technical or technological solution will bring about its cessation.”<sup>84</sup>

Once it became apparent that various punitive actions would not stop the uprising, the IDF decided to try and undermine Intifada leadership. One of the more drastic measures was the “transfer” or deportation of key leaders outside the country. This type of exile was thought to be a more permanent solution than local arrest or detention. This policy also became one of the more controversial methods employed by the IDF, primarily because of cries both in and out of Israel that it violated the 1949 Geneva Convention provision of moving large civilian populations in occupied territories. Israel argued that this provision was meant to prevent holocaust like atrocities of deporting civilians to labor or death camps and did not prevent an occupying power from the maintenance of law and order. Israeli law permitted deportation by military forces when “necessary or desirable to preserve public security, defend the area, secure public order, or to put down sedition, revolt, or riots.”<sup>85</sup>

After two months of struggling with the uprising, Israel began to implement the deportation policy, which expanded to include journalists, mayors, teachers, newspaper editors, student activists, lawyers and others charged with membership in organizations the IDF had labeled as "terrorist."<sup>86</sup> The deportation policy only applied to the territories of the West Bank and Gaza so that many outspoken Palestinians living in Israel remained vocal and unaffected by this provision. This of course was not the only time that Israel had resorted to deportation. The amount of people did not reach the peak of what Israel had deported in the 1960s and 1970s, but there were over fifty deportations in 1988, which was double the number over the previous two and a half years.<sup>87</sup>

These people were escorted to and released in the buffer zone between Israel and Lebanon, which Israel still controlled. In the first three years of the Intifada, opposition groups charged that the IDF had deported up to 2,000 Arabs, while Israel claimed that only 60 bona fide West Bankers were exiled, the rest being in the country illegally. Although not necessarily a new tactic, deportation was still greatly controversial in Israeli society. Debate raged over what it might or might not achieve. IDF leadership thought that it would at least provide a "short term deterrent to further disturbance." Many others felt that deporting Palestinians from their homeland for political purposes would only stir up further opposition in the territories. In fact, one study demonstrated a direct correlation between deportations and an increase in overall all number of violent incidents (including stone throwing, gasoline grenades, arson, tire burning, and rioting) from January 1988 through January 1989.<sup>88</sup> This seems to demonstrate limitations for deportation as a tactic for decreasing violence. Still others argued that the deportations increased

opposition from Israeli civil rights groups and would likely result in additional censure from Western powers, particularly the United States.<sup>89</sup>

Curfews were an attempt to isolate individual communities and wear them down one by one. It had the added benefit of temporarily reducing larger scale uprising activities. This was a direct counter-tactic to the mass demonstrations that were being held by the Palestinians. During the Intifada's first year, as many as 1,600 curfews were ordered. The IDF's difficulty with this tactic was that it did not have enough manpower to impose them effectively. As a result, duty in the reserve forces was raised in many cases from forty-five to sixty days.<sup>90</sup>

Curfews varied in length from as little as three days up to forty days — usually for twenty-four hours a day. This imposed severe hardship on many Palestinians. Details of curfews varied somewhat, but generally those under curfew were not to leave their homes for any reason. If curfew rules established staying away from windows or balconies — violators could be shot on sight.

These efforts were used somewhat effectively to make searches for gasoline grenades or other bomb materials, but reported abuses by the IDF in Palestinian homes were rampant. An alternate curfew method employed was to label an entire village as a “closed area” where people could come and go from their homes but no one could leave or enter the village. Some reports indicate that “during ‘closure,’ water, electricity, and telephone services were often disconnected.”<sup>91</sup> Again, Shalev maintains that although curfews can reduce some amounts of violence, by default they also automatically “involve” ever greater percentages of the population, some of which might not have been earlier

participants. The frustration of those previously uninvolved, but now involved "by default" in a form of mass punishment, undoubtedly leads to further overall resentment and thus may in fact encourage greater local opposition.<sup>92</sup>

Unable to cut off the Intifada's head and/or heart, the IDF attempted to cripple the uprising's arms and legs, i.e. those most involved with protest activities. This included the use of various legal means such as mass arrests, imprisonments, fines and administrative detention. This expanded the detention of those arrested not just to violence perpetrators but to anyone loosely connected to activist activities.

Under Defense (Emergency) Regulations which governed much of the IDF's activities in the territories, any soldier (or policeman) could make an arrest without a warrant and could detain someone for four days, and then held for another four. Detainees could be held waiting for a military court for up to eighteen days, and a military court could then extend detention for six additional months without trial.<sup>93</sup> This procedure of arrest could be repeated indefinitely. This process had been used before but had begun to decline prior to the Intifada. It is estimated that as many as 18,000 Palestinians were arrested in the first year of the uprising. In 1988 this included nearly 10,000 at any one time of which several thousand were in administrative detention. Arrestees included women and children, some fourteen or fifteen years old. Some sources cite that from the beginning of the uprising until June 1989, Israel arrested about 35,000 Palestinians.<sup>94</sup>

Mass arrests as collective punishment were meant to discourage participation in uprising activities. In 1988 there were instances of hundreds being arrested or even the entire male population of a village detained for questioning (in some instances for days).<sup>95</sup>



While this tactic may have deterred or intimidated some, others argue that it lessened respect for the Israeli justice system, brought collective unity to community wide support for uprising activities, and may have politically activated some youths who had only previously been bystanders. In fact, mass arrests swamped detention facilities and logistical support for those held in them. In addition, the collective nature of detention transformed some make-shift holding areas into what some decried as the “single most efficient institution for the indoctrination of Gaza youth” providing a live-in campus of “how to courses” on such topics as explosives manufacture and Palestinian nationalism.<sup>96</sup> Shalev contends that, overall, judicial measures did not reduce violence levels or act as effective deterrents to violence.<sup>97</sup>

When this did not work the IDF set about to break the Palestinian communal spirit by targeting societal structures through which Palestinian social life operated. Schools and universities were the first to be targeted. It was thought that these were “centers of civil resistance” and breeding grounds through which new leadership was feeding the uprising, therefore it was prudent to weaken them. Even before the Intifada, many in Israel, including many IDF officers, thought that universities in the territories served more as political indoctrination centers than genuine educational institutions.<sup>98</sup>

Schools were therefore closed for several months at a time by the IDF, and this practice increased in frequency during the Intifada years. Although lower level schools were re-opened for the 1988-89 school year, universities were ordered not to reopen until further notice. If however the IDF sought success in this area, such closures most assuredly put a greater number of Palestinian youth on the street, decreased discipline and

orderly schedules, while increasing boredom and free time to participate in uprising activities. This most certainly had the opposite effect of that intended. Other youth and charitable organizations were also targeted if the IDF felt that they were promoting Palestinian nationalism.<sup>99</sup>

House demolitions were another tactic that had been used before and during the uprising in Lebanon and in Israel. Although many thought this to be an especially effective deterrent, Shalev maintains that there was no significant decrease in violent acts following such action. Israeli records show through the end of June 1989, the IDF demolished 228 houses and sealed another 102. House demolitions seemed to actually lead to further escalation of resistance. Later in the uprising, PLO funds were used to compensate affected families, thus rendering the hardship of this tactic to that of short duration, and undermining any deterrent effect it might have had.<sup>100</sup>

Although not entirely in the IDF's realm of control, allegations exist that Israel's highest political leaders ordered the political assassination of PLO leaders such as Abu Jihad, Arafat's closest aide, who was suspected by Army intelligence of directing the Intifada from abroad. Ze'ev Schiff, a leading commentator on the Israeli military, contends that up until the time of the Intifada, the IDF and the Israeli government had, in effect, an unwritten law that senior PLO leaders "would not be attacked personally."<sup>101</sup> As predicted by those opposed to such a policy, Jihad's death sparked a new wave of violence and unrest.

## **2) Conclusions on Methods**

If historical experience teaches us anything about revolutionary [guerrilla] war, it is that military measures alone will not suffice.

Brigadier General S. B. Griffith <sup>102</sup>

Most IDF officers finally concluded that a heavy reliance on a military solution was a losing proposition. Some in the IDF had been saying that from the beginning. Shalev's study concludes that:

Despite IDF countermeasures as well as sanctions by the civil administration (mainly school closings) — the uprising was not suppressed, while Israeli rule in the territories was weakened. By 1989 the IDF high command was forced to admit they still had no effective response to the stone-throwing. The last hope for a panacea — plastic bullets — was equally ineffective in stopping the uprising. <sup>103</sup>

By May 1989, the Israeli defense minister stated, "the mission of the IDF in the territories was to lower the level of violence significantly and to allow the normal functioning of the government apparatus. Unfortunately, I am unable to say that this objective has been attained." <sup>104</sup> As one Israeli professor noted, and more and more IDF officers agreed, the Intifada was "a threat against which the whole might of the Israeli Army might not suffice. . . . An army can beat an army, but an army cannot beat a people. Israel is learning that power has limits." <sup>105</sup> The specific methods employed by the IDF to reduce violence in the territories each had boundaries of effectiveness. Overall there was a growing awareness of what the application of military force could and could not accomplish.

There is a military solution - one we are likely never to allow from a government standpoint or from our own military ethos. The "nuclear" approach - epitomized by Syrian's systematic and total military destruction of the village Hama.<sup>106</sup> Similarly, the IDF Chief of Staff, clearly reflected this understanding when he stated that, "the only way to suppress completely a violent struggle waged by civilians is to employ extreme tactics, such as [a population] transfer, starvation or genocide — and none of these means is acceptable to the State of Israel."<sup>107</sup>

There were other problems growing out of the Intifada swamp as well. Segments of Israeli society began to worry that the methods employed by the IDF in dealing with the difficulties of the uprising were "corrupting the IDF and Israel itself. There was concern as well in some Army circles (backed by warnings from psychologists) that such endemic violence might become the norm for brutality not only in the territories but in Israel itself.<sup>108</sup> The *Jerusalem Post* aired its concern about "the growing frequency with which soldiers lost control citing as an example IDF graffiti on the walls of a Palestinian school which read, 'Death to the Arabs!'"<sup>109</sup> Other sources cite examples of soldiers beating suspects after placing them under arrest. In one case, two soldiers were brought to trial for trying to bury four Palestinian rioters alive.<sup>110</sup>

As the above examples show, the army appeared to be encouraging soldiers to violate their own norms of behavior. In one study, as many as fifteen percent of the soldiers were emotionally torn by the tasks assigned them. Soldiers not only received orders to inflict brutality on Palestinians, on other occasions they were ordered to protect Palestinians

from Israeli civilians' brutality. In addition, many peace demonstrators often shouted encouragement for soldiers to disobey their orders.

A characteristic statement made by a soldier affected by his own brutality was, "the more I break other people's bones, the more I am broken myself."<sup>111</sup> This type of psychological self dissonance was predictable. As a result of these negative impacts on the soldier, which in some cases was quite severe, educational classes were given to reduce the amount of "indiscriminate" violence being evidenced by the IDF. Although brutality against protestors was sanctioned, indiscriminate violence against any by-standers and other civilians was more and more becoming an outlet of many soldiers' psychological frustrations. Teaching and promoting slogans such as "all Arabs are not monsters" and "don't lose your humanity," the IDF failed to have more than a negligible effect on unsanctioned violence during IDF operations within the territories.<sup>112</sup>

The bottom line is that military tactics of coercion within the limits set by the Israeli government did not by themselves offer an adequate solution to an unconventional asymmetrical situation presented by the Intifada. Even when Israel exceeded U.S. tolerance for certain policies and tactics, such as deportation, destruction of Palestinian homes and the brutal beatings, an effective solution for quelling the violence in the territories evaded the IDF.

Conventional police tactics, new technologies, nor tactics aimed at legal punishments or societal structures changed the overall situation. Mass demonstrations and civil resistance, although in varying degrees of intensity and involvement, still persisted. By the end of the first year the uprising was, if anything, stronger than when it started,

despite IDF efforts. During the Intifada period IDF actions resulted in numbers of Palestinians killed, wounded, arrested, imprisoned, deported, and homes blown up or sealed that was several times the amount of any previous uprising since 1967.<sup>113</sup> For example, in 1988, "on average, one Palestinian a day was killed, and overall another 20,000 were wounded, 20,000 were imprisoned, 200 homes were either destroyed or sealed and forty-five suspected Intifada leaders were deported,"<sup>114</sup> all without accomplishment of the main purpose of containing the uprising. It has been estimated that it took three times the number of soldiers to confront the uprising than it took to conquer the territories in 1967 and cost Israel two to three billion dollars.<sup>115</sup> Echoing the lessons of Mao and Lawrence, there were no effective methods of military pure solutions (acceptable to a democratic society) against an enemy with broad based popular support who was committed to protracted conflict.

It should be noted here that Israel did attempt to partially address the uprising through use of economic sanctions against the Palestinians. Punitive economic efforts (although outside the bounds of this paper) did include blocking the export of olive oil to Jordan, preventing local olive oil production, destroying food stocks and farm equipment (as punishments for rioting, harboring suspects or nonpayment of taxes), attempting to limit circulation of funds (by restricting the amount of cash a person could carry), and various attempts to undermine the flow of PLO backed finance into the country (chiefly through restriction of Jordanian bank transfers, and remittances received from abroad).<sup>116</sup> Over time these economic measures began to erode the underpinnings of the Palestinian economy. This caused serious damage to the people of the West Bank and Gaza because

they were so closely tied to the Israeli economic base, yet it had little real effect on the uprising. After two years the Intifada continued almost unabated. <sup>117</sup>

#### **b. Training**

Within weeks of the outbreak of the Intifada, Israeli military leadership recognized that this was something new, and something that IDF soldiers were not specifically trained for. One paratrooper Lieutenant Colonel on patrol in Nablus, (a West Bank village) said that "from the minute the uprising began he knew that he was in a whole new kind of war from anything he had been trained for." <sup>118</sup>

Many argue that there is, in fact, a fundamental difference exists between police actions and military operations, <sup>119</sup> and that "operationally, the IDF had no training for putting down such disturbances" as riot control agents. <sup>120</sup> Although there was a lack of training in these types of operations, the IDF (from all accounts) was adaptable enough for this not to be a long-term problem. Although in the short-term this took the form of groping in the dark, patrolling in the territories which served as a sort of "on the job training" soon demonstrated what equipment was lacking for personal soldier protection. The IDF was soon equipped and capable of conducting these operations to the limits of their capabilities. Overall, the lack of any special police training did not seem to significantly alter or effect the outcome.

### **c. Operational Planning and Linkages**

Two major challenges, especially early on in the Intifada conflict, were that 1) the IDF experienced difficulty in defining the threat,<sup>121</sup> and 2) they lacked any operational level framework to tackle the problem. The uprising seemed to have two sides, strategic aims and tactical methods. The IDF failed to implement an overall campaign plan that linked tactical actions with strategic endstates. There were tactical methods employed, and there were strategic ends defined (i.e. a peaceful settlement to the Palestinian issue), but the extremely large gaping hole left exposed is the lack of an operational plan that would link the two. This is in the end the exact purpose of "operational art" so that neither tactical means or strategic goals operate in isolation from one another in what is termed a "decoupling" of ends and means.

Although a wide variety of tactical "solutions" had been attempted, the uprising continued even when it seemed that circumstances would dictate otherwise. Even with staggeringly large numbers of killed and wounded, (especially in proportion to the relatively low amount of IDF casualties - for example the earlier citation in 1988, of several hundred killed, another 20,000 wounded), terrible hardships (20,000 imprisoned, 200 homes destroyed, forty-five suspected leaders deported, curfews, closures), growing problems economically (with the collapse of the Jordanian dinar & continued economic pressure from Israel), and political difficulties (by the PLO siding with Saddam during the Gulf War and political infighting among PLO, Islamic and Palestinian factions), the



uprising maintained a protracted tenacity over several years — ebbing occasionally, but never ending or disappearing.

The over all policy (chiefly a coercive military solution weighted with increased pressure on social institutions and punitive economic measures), was however one that was ill suited for a lasting solution without the addition of a comprehensive political engagement. Operational level planning never showed itself clearly in the historical accounts. The political cry for a military solution crippled effective civil-military cooperation in solving the problems of the uprising through an operational linkage.

#### **E. Civil-Military Interaction**

It is by combined use of politics and force that pacification of a country will be achieved. Political action is by far the more important.

Marshal Joseph Simon Gallieni <sup>122</sup>

Again, while it was generally recognized both within the military and the government that the uprising posed a negligible military threat to Israel, <sup>123</sup> there was great reluctance to offer solutions in the diplomatic and economic realms at least until the uprising had been “put down.” Until the political pressure both in and outside the country grew unbearable, the only solution the government pursued was that of coercion, chiefly through the military and aided by some economic pressures.

One great frustration of the civil-military relationship in Israel was the recognition that the Palestinians had learned to “take advantage of Israeli society to advance its cause.” <sup>124</sup> They clearly understood that Israel’s values imposed constraints upon its

army's conduct. As one Arab observer commented, "they [the Palestinians] know that the Israelis are not Syrians." <sup>125</sup> Some Israelis grew very frustrated over this. "How can a democracy, they asked, defend itself against undemocratic elements while remaining faithful to its principles?" <sup>126</sup>

This issue, exasperated by media coverage of the Israeli "oppression," particularly hampered military operations although it most likely lessened abuses of power. The media's focused attention on "brutal" administration policies in the territories caused additional problems for the Israeli government. Instead of the earlier depicted Israeli "David" against all the surrounding Arab countries depicted as "Goliath," the media exposed the small, struggling stone slinging "teenage" Palestinian (David) against the oppressive overwhelming IDF (Goliath). This type of press coverage was new to Israel. The Palestinians knew that when pressed, the IDF could be ruthless, but that was now buffered by the democratic nature of their own society, especially when surrounded by television cameras. <sup>127</sup> In fact, the media exposure began to turn even strong American Jewish supporters against Israel. Editorials in the *New York Times*, such as the following, further alienated the American Jewish community and led to American frustration with Israeli military conduct:

As a supporter of Israel, and as one who has always been outraged at the horrors inflicted on this little nation by hostile neighbors, vile terrorists and much of the world at large, I am appalled beyond measure by the treatment of the rioting Palestinians by Jews. I mean, fellas, are you kidding? . . . Breaking the hands of men and women so they can't throw stones? Dragging civilians out of their houses at random to smash them with sticks in an effort to terrorize a population into quiet? . . . Am I reading the newspapers correctly? . . . Are we talking about state-sanctioned brutality and even torture? My goodness! <sup>128</sup>

Such frustration threatened American support and further alienated the military who was conducting operations in the territories from popular civil support in Israel. The confusion of messages sent by the Israeli government did not help matters. Official statements from the government justifying more brutal techniques were interspersed with other statements disavowing such practices.

It is clear that the abundance of reporters and the presence of the media, especially television crews, helped curtail IDF methods, specifically the amount of violence that they could impose, in the territories. Colonels in the IDF spoke about the great difference the presence of media had on their activities in the West Bank as opposed to the greater relative freedom with which they operated in South Lebanon. One senior commander actually told his men the following: "Don't beat anyone if you see a TV camera. If you are already beating someone and you see a camera, stop. If you see someone else beating someone and you see a camera, stop him." <sup>129</sup>

As stated earlier, the Palestinians sought to renew the visibility of their plight upon the world stage. To that end, Palestinians on many occasions deftly manipulated the media for exposure of their cause. Well known foreign correspondents often received anonymous calls to be at staged events. One story is told of a Palestinian woman who upon seeing cameras approach asked, "is it time to wail yet?" <sup>130</sup>

However, even though media coverage directly influenced local IDF actions and indirectly impacted on the Israeli government, (mainly through the resulting civilian outcry and political pressure — especially from the U.S.), there is significantly less data to

support the fact that Israeli public opinion significantly affected policy-making to refrain from violence in the territories. One extensive study on Israeli public opinion and its impact on the IDF's use of force in the territories indicates that *public opinion* on the use of force did not vary greatly even under marked changes in public attitude towards the territories and the Palestinians themselves. Therefore public opinion as somewhat supportive of "tough" tactics in the territories had little impact on reducing the government's policy concerning the amount of force used during the uprising.<sup>131</sup>

#### **F. Impacts and Outcomes for Israel, the Palestinians, the PLO and the Region**

The wolf also shall dwell with the lamb, and the leopard shall lie down with the kid; and the calf and the young lion and the fatling together. Isaiah 11:6<sup>132</sup>

One American scholar on the Palestinians drew the conclusion that the Intifada represented the first time that the entire social strata was involved in uprising, that "the whole population was rebelling."<sup>133</sup> Another stated that, "the Arab-Israeli conflict was no longer a war between men fought on distant battlefields but a clash in which entire populations, including women and children, were deeply involved."<sup>134</sup> In describing the lasting impact of the uprising, one went so far as to state that the "Intifada had achieved more in its first few months than decades of PLO terrorism had achieved outside the country."<sup>135</sup>

Although the IDF had inflicted severe damage on the inhabitants and economy of the West Bank and Gaza, it also failed to end the uprising or to eliminate the grassroots support of Palestinian leadership. Palestinian society was more unified than it had been

before the uprising. Palestinian nationalist sentiment burned more intensely than before the beginning of the Intifada, and a clear-cut political aim was being formulated within the territories. This, in turn, forced the PLO to clarify its goals in the Arab-Israeli dispute.

Israeli society was now also forced to consider alternatives to the burden of the occupation. The Palestinian issue emerged as a major issue in Israeli elections, and Israelis were polarized over the Intifada as well as strategies for dealing with it.<sup>136</sup> The Israeli government was eventually forced to make political concessions concerning the Palestinians, while there began serious introspection in Israeli society about national values and specifically the role of the army.<sup>137</sup>

Israeli government moved to allow elections in the West Bank and Gaza although it refused to accept an independent Palestinian State. The possibility of such an occurrence, however, loomed larger than it ever had, and even if a Palestinian State was not forthcoming, the Palestinian issue grew to greater prominence on the world stage. Although the IDF did not win this conflict they held out long enough for the confluence of world events and the fall out for the PLO from supporting Saddam during the Gulf War to tip the scale back in Israel's favor. This allowed Israel enough "face" to follow through with negotiations, which ultimately led to the on-going peace process.

The Intifada also resulted in the disengagement of Jordan's King Hussein from arbitrator of the West Bank and a growth in militant Islamic groups in the West Bank and Gaza.<sup>138</sup> Moreover, the PLO was forced from its policy of "constructive ambiguity" on the key issue of recognizing Israel's right to exist and, at least, forced a verbal renouncing

of terrorism. By mid 1992, Labor was re-seated and committed to a peaceful settlement under Rabin's leadership even if it meant some form of territorial compromise. A shift in Israeli public opinion began to move towards Palestinian self-rule, especially for Gaza.<sup>139</sup>

As several authors cautioned, however, the lasting impact of the Intifada is by no means certain, as the final outcome of the Palestinian-Israeli peace process is unknown. Some have even predicted a second Intifada. What has already occurred may only be a prelude of the next stage of a lasting struggle.<sup>140</sup> Impacts of the uprising are still being felt today. Perhaps the real outcome of the Intifada was that of a hot swirling whirlwind blowing out of Gaza, through Oslo and Madrid, its currents the major impetus on which set sail the conditions that ultimately led to the historic events dramatically played out in Washington on the White House lawn in September 1993.<sup>141</sup>

### **III. Lessons for XXIst Century American Forces**

For now we see through a glass, darkly I Corinthians 13:12<sup>142</sup>

There are valuable lessons for situations that the U.S. military will likely face in the future that can be learned from the Intifada experience. These lessons can particularly illuminate the complexities of protracted unconventional asymmetrical warfare. And although we may not be able to see very far into the future, we can with confidence agree with Plato's assertion that "only the dead have seen the end of war."<sup>143</sup> And, as the U.S. military grows stronger technologically in comparison to other military forces, that future seems ever more certain to contain an increasing amount of asymmetrical conflicts.

## **A. Emerging Security Environment Implications**

### **1. Overall Trends**

As stated in the introduction, the likely spectrum of future war ranges from large scale, high tech combat operations against a peer competitor, through security operations to deter regional powers, to serving as a protection force for humanitarian assistance efforts being conducted by the UN, local governments, or non-governmental organizations, (NGOs).<sup>144</sup> We can today at best describe trends that might reflect the path of several possible futures for the international security environment.

Dr. Steven Metz, an analyst at the Strategic Studies Institute and author of more than fifty articles on world politics and national security, argues that the larger security environment is in a state of transition that could eventually settle into one of several different alternative future states. Warfare in these projected scenarios range from traditional state-based warfare, to one framed by states dealing primarily with internal collapse and violence. Other possibilities include a tiered environment along the have and have not lines, and continued conflicts along ideological or economic lines.<sup>145</sup>

### **2. Possibility/Implications of Increased Asymmetrical Threats**

Whereas these constructs might lead to a yet unknown post Cold War security environment, strategists highlight other trends emerging as part of a possible future conflict matrix over the next ten to fifteen years. In addition to likely technological

advances in information warfare, communications equipment and advanced weaponry, these trends include:

- Continued regional conflicts world-wide
- Vast population growth in many under developed countries and regions
- Continued growth of international organized crime
- Expanding proliferation of WMD, particularly by non-state actors
- Increases in terrorism, especially in ability to use and probability in using WMD
- Increases in asymmetrical warfare between the United States and other entities

Several of these trends could fuel or spark situations where the U.S. military finds itself in situations very similar to the IDF's experience with the Intifada. Although not inclusive, this list's importance is two-fold. First, it highlights the breadth of the spectrum and backdrop against which a future military force must be able to contend with. Secondly, it highlights the likely probability of US involvement in asymmetrical threats as opponents may be increasingly reluctant to face the superiority of the U.S. military's technological capabilities. In fact, the strategy document planners used in the formulation of the QDR stated that, "the demand for smaller scale contingency operations is expected to remain high over the next 10-15 years."<sup>146</sup>

Marine General John Sheehan while commander of U.S. Atlantic Commander said that because of the globalization of information, population growth and migration he sees "a whole lot of Albanias and Haitis and Mogadishus" in the future. And then he went on to say that what we did not know enough about was asymmetrical warfare, "where an enemy attacks your weaknesses rather than trying to match your strength."<sup>147</sup> Navy Captain James Stavridis in writing on revolutions in military affairs goes on to explain



that although such asymmetrical interaction is unlikely to endanger our national existence, it could certainly threaten our critical national interests. By by-passing our military strengths (such as our technological abilities) and attacking our weaknesses (possibly the will of the American public to tolerate casualties or involvement in a protracted regional conflict), Stavridis illustrates that an enemy can gain leverage out of proportion to his political, economic or military strength — in essence, asymmetrical leverage.<sup>148</sup>

The National Security Strategy (NSS) delineates our national interests (including those of vital interest — or those we as a nation are prepared to protect with military force). The major threats to our interests are broadly categorized as regional or State-centered threats, transnational threats, (such as terrorism, drug trade, organized crime and environmental damage), and threats from weapons of mass destruction.<sup>149</sup> In the event that military force is opted for as a strategic solution, the NSS points out that a military response encompasses a “full range” of operations up to and including major theater warfare and “accordingly, U.S. forces will remain multi-mission capable.”<sup>150</sup> In describing the military’s role in our national strategy, the NSS points out that the military must be able to “rapidly defeat initial enemy advances short of enemy objectives,” . . . in an environment that may well be characterized by asymmetrical means such as “WMD, information operations or terrorism.”<sup>151</sup> The National Military Strategy (NMS), which is derived from the NSS, also includes in the spectrum of future threats the combination of asymmetrical challenges and transnational dangers, and highlights the necessity of maintaining a credible force to deal with these threats.<sup>152</sup>

However, saying that it must be done is not the same thing as successfully accomplishing it. The Israeli government essentially told the IDF to employ its military superiority and “rapidly” defeat the popular Palestinian uprising in the territories. The Palestinians thwarted the IDF’s ability to achieve its military aim — that of imposing its will on the Palestinians by subduing local violence and civil disobedience through the use of coercive force. Instead, the Palestinian people waged a committed protracted asymmetrical struggle against Israel’s weakness (a democratic government and international goodwill) while refusing to face (or deftly side stepping) Israeli tanks and artillery shells completely.

The case study of what occurred between the IDF and the Palestinians during the Intifada uprising raises some interesting issues concerning whether or not a heavily armed military (specifically an army) can effectively deal with a protracted popular uprising in an asymmetrical environment like that faced by the IDF in the early 1990’s.

#### **B. Operational Art in Other Than War Environment**

One of the glaring lessons in this case study is the seeming lack of Operational linkage between the IDF and the Israeli government. As the complexity of war grew in the earlier portion of this century, military theorists and practitioners came to understand that a new level of war was emerging between the earlier pillars of tactics and strategy that comprised war prior to Napoleon. Various theorists, (notably the Russians) began to highlight characteristics of modern war’s complexity and difficulty that required an intermidate process by which this complexity could be better managed in the quest for

more efficient control. Out of this thinking, over time, emerged what the military now refers to as the Operational Level of War, and the distinguishing features of practicing “Operational Art.”

For many historians and theorists this construct of operational art remains a particular feature of conventional warfare, particularly at the higher end of the spectrum of conflict. However, practitioners in the military, holding firm to a conviction that military forces can adequately conduct operations across the spectrum of warfare all the way from major force on force conflict, to operations other than war (OOTW — soon to be renamed stability and support operations — SASO) expanded the definition of operational art to encompass these areas.

In some ways this is an emerging concept. The definition in the current (soon to be released in new form) FM 100-5, *Operations*, describes operational art as the “employment of military forces to attain strategic goals through the design, organization, integration, and execution of battles and engagements into campaigns and major operations.”<sup>153</sup> Interestingly, it then points out that operational art determines when, where, and for what purpose major forces will fight over time.<sup>154</sup>

Of greater significance is the later definition given in FM 100-7, *Decisive Force: The Army in Theater Operations* and the mirror Joint definition found in Joint Pub 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations*. These manuals define operational art as follows:

The skillful employment of military forces to attain strategic and/or operational objectives through the design, organization, integration, and conduct of strategies, campaigns, major operations, and battles. Operational art translates the [theater] or joint force commander’s strategy into

operational design, and , ultimately, tactical action, by integrating the key activities of all levels of war. <sup>155</sup>

Joint Doctrinal Manuals go on to point out that activities at the operational level of war,

link tactics and strategy by establishing operational objectives needed to accomplish the strategic objectives, sequencing events to achieve operational objectives, initiating actions, and applying resources to bring about and sustain these events. These activities imply a broader dimension of time or space than do tactics; they ensure the logistic and administrative support of tactical forces, and provide the means by which tactical successes are exploited to achieve strategic objectives. <sup>156</sup>

In addition, the U.S. Military has established principles for conducting OOTW that differ somewhat from conventional operations. The two major differing principles that characterize OOTW from conventional warfare are "legitimacy" (sustaining the willing acceptance by the people of the right of the government to govern) and "restraint" (applying appropriate military capability prudently). <sup>157</sup>

General James Dubik, in a lecture to the 1998 SAMS class, concluded that actions taken by the American Army in Haiti were planned in the framework of an operational campaign, and practically linked the tactical use of military power and military forces towards the attainment of strategic national aims. In other words, the military purposefully engaged in "operational art" in a OOTW/SASO environment. Although the tasks of the military were not combat oriented, the use of military forces and resources was extremely complicated. A campaign plan was devised to use military resources to achieve the overall strategic endstate — in this case to return the government to stability. Each use of military functionality, whether providing potable water, re-establishing communications infrastructure, providing limited security from looting and rioting, or

providing local medical support were integrated to achieve the national interest aim understood by the military commander.

General David Grange, who was the commander of Task Force Eagle in Bosnia, describes the need in that environment to use military force to assist in the accomplishment of the civilian aspects of the Dayton Accords.

We must pursue an integrated campaign that leverages the full spectrum of military capabilities in information operations, conventional/counter-insurgency operations and intelligence capabilities in order to create the conditions to support the formation of a politically stable environment. In order to do this, we must seize the initiative in the area of responsibility by dislocating our adversaries' decision cycles, preempting their actions, and forcing them to respond to our actions. We must shape the environment into one that favors the peaceful implementation of the General Framework Agreement for Peace (GFAP) by identifying and disrupting linkages between crime, terrorism, black marketing and disinformation currently used by those in power who prefer the status quo. This will set advantageous conditions for SFOR and the IO's to create a politically stable environment and a lasting peace. Shaping such a complex environment requires a well orchestrated campaign using a wide range of collection systems, followed by synchronized operations with the right mix of military, political and informational assets.<sup>158</sup>

In facing the Intifada, the conditions that the IDF found themselves in were not the roles traditionally trained for by conventional forces, they were more in the realm of OOTW or SASO. The IDF's experience was in conventional warfare and some counter-insurgency against traditional guerrilla forces. The IDF proved reluctant to become involved in the Intifada uprising. Involvement in a protracted struggle in the territories was going to be a "policing" action characterized by OOTW conditions. Its roots lay in a set of social, political and economic conditions that could not be adequately addressed primarily through military means.

This seems to be a glaring deficiency of the IDF's and the Israeli government's dealing with the uprising. There are no indications in the research for this monograph that details an operational campaign design on the part of the IDF. There were tactical methods employed but little if any linkage of those tactical activities to the nation's strategic aims, (beyond the vaguely defined "reduction of violence" to set the stage for later diplomatic action).

The IDF is certainly not alone in the blame here, because the government, after the IDF leadership advocated a political solution, continued to pursue a policy relying almost exclusively on the military as an instrument of national power to solve what in essence was a social-political problem. Although the Israeli government used limited punitive economic attempts to bolster the coercive use of force, there seems to be completely inadequate employment of the diplomatic instrument of power in this situation.

Operationally, the IDF also failed to properly analyze the enemy and its culture. General Grange states that "knowing our adversaries and predicting their future moves is more difficult in Stability and Support Operations (SASO's) than in conventional operations. We must draw relevant information from a complex environment that spans media, political, criminal, business, military and paramilitary structures."<sup>159</sup> While IDF Rules of Engagement (ROE) provided a form of restraint there is ample evidence that disciplined restraint was inadequate and possibly improperly understood as a principle of operations other than war. In fact, IDF lack of restraint fed the bitterness and anger of those they were suppose to pacify.

Likewise, there seems to have been little to no understanding of the principle of legitimacy in this kind of conflict. "More important than coercion and mitigating against its centrality is enhancing perceived legitimacy."<sup>160</sup> No IDF actions or tactical methods sought to gain the hearts and minds of the Palestinian populace which many have argued must be a prime candidate for the center of gravity in any type of counter-insurgency operation. A properly constructed operational level strategy that linked Israel's strategic endstates with tactical actions the IDF was conducting in the territories would have resulted in many fewer actions that fanned the flames of Palestinian unrest. If in fact the Intifada was a result of social, political and economic conditions, which the history seems to clearly demonstrate, then coercion could not hope to solve these problems. All stick — no carrot. No operational analysis or plan existed to link together a successful strategy.

One major feature of designing a successful theater level operational strategy is the proper advisement of not only military capabilities, (what the military can accomplish in a particular situational context), but advisement of military limitations in that same environment.<sup>161</sup> Although a war-fighting CINC will not have control of all the resources of the diplomatic, economic or informational instruments of power in designing an operational strategy, he must skillfully weave them into his plan and his recommendations for their use either in support of military operations, or vice versa. This is the single most glaring inadequacy of Israel's strategy in dealing with the uprising.

Operational or theater level "mission analysis" was faulty on the part of Israel from the standpoint that it should have resulted in a clearer understanding of the limited use of the application of military force to accomplish the stated interests of the government.

Interestingly, although the Palestinians did not operate with this level of institutional planning, their collective “analysis” of the need to limit their own use of force proved correct and was instrumental in their successful “application” of asymmetrical leverage. Dictates of the Israeli government essentially left the IDF leadership to focus on tactical military approaches to the Intifada problem to gain limited political advantage.

### **C. Lessons for the XXIst Century Warrior**

#### **1. On the Nature of the Enemy and the Environment**

Two lessons on the lower end of the spectrum of conflict continue to emerge. The first has been clearly demonstrated by Mao and Lawrence. The first lesson is that one of the most difficult of all war scenarios is a broad based popular war that has two characteristics — nationalistic fervor and a protracted nature.

Nationalistic fervor lends passionate commitment, even in the midst of hardship, to those caught up in the dream of an ideal. It is ironic that Israeli Jews failed to see in the Palestinians’ aspirations the same strength that they themselves possessed to create the State of Israel in 1948. The second characteristic, that of a protracted nature, is fed from the first (nationalistic sentiment). It is the willingness to fight “forever.” The protracted nature of such a conflict is what makes it so difficult to adequately combat. This is especially true for a democratic society that may lose interest over time. Newly elected officials constantly introduce new agendas making it difficult to maintain continuity for policies concerning a protracted war. If the struggle is far from the country’s own borders



(such as is likely to be the case with U.S. power projection), the average citizen may determine he has no long-term interest in a long commitment.

The second lesson has to do with the OOTW environment. More and more is being written on the particular nature of the analysis that must be done in this type of environment. Specifically, it is necessary to have an understanding of the cultural aspects of the population, and it is being recognized that it may be more difficult to clearly define the nature of the threat. For the IDF, were the Palestinians the enemy or was “conflict or violence” in the territories the enemy? It could be argued that the IDF fed more instability than they promoted stability in the territories. This is an important distinction. If the Palestinian people are the enemy then they should be dealt with much like the IDF attempted to deal with them. If conflict is the enemy, then measures must be taken to lessen the reasons for that violence (possibly through political or economic concessions to the underlying causes of the uprising) as opposed to measures taken to lessen the violence itself. Certainly if stability is the goal or endstate, then “instability” or conflict may be the threat to that goal — not the antagonists themselves. If this is true then tactics should be chosen that would promote stability, not tactics that would fan the flames of increased bitterness, further isolation or militant nationalism.

## **2. On the Nature of Sticks**

Sticks are useful for coercion but they have their limitations. A legitimate use of the military as an instrument of power is for coercion or the threat of it, either for deterrent

value or actual use of armed force. Here again is the range of coercive tactics employed by the IDF, most to little effect on quelling violence in the territories.

**Military Efforts:**

- Road blocks
- Show of force in larger and more permanent postings
- Dispersing demonstrations
- Psychological and information operations
- New technologies: (aerial surveillance, vehicle mounted rock throwers)
- Riot equipment: (protective equipment, riot batons)
- Rubber bullets, tear gas, and plastic bullets
- Exile/deportations
- Curfews

**Legal Efforts:**

- Trials, imprisonment, fines
- Administrative detention

**Efforts Against Societal Structures:**

- School/shop closings
- Shutting off phone services and electricity
- House demolitions

The nature of coercion is actually defined by who controls it. Although the coercer controls the *amount* of coercion that will be applied, it is the *person being coerced* that will decide what amount, if any, will succeed in coercing them. In addressing this issue, Dr. Cable states that "the British [American Revolution], like the Americans 190 years later [Vietnam] and the Israelis more recently, overlooked the unpleasant fact that coercion is defined by the target not by the employer."<sup>162</sup> This is an important point in understanding a conflict that is popular based, with nationalistic or other idealistic commitment, and is going to be waged for a protracted period. Just because force is increased will not necessarily achieve compliance. History is full of martyrs willing to die rather than succumb. In such a case, increased coercion may only worsen the situation,

resulting in tactical wins and strategic losses. The primary lesson here is that force has limitations and military practitioners as well as policy makers would do well to understand them.

A related lesson is the particular limitations imposed by the specific self imposed constraints, restraints and limitations placed on militaries by democratic forms of government. In other words, particularly in a democratically elected government, the role of coercion (sticks) is self-limited. You can only go so far, beyond which the society will not tolerate military actions. These limitations are wrapped in human-rights, end-states, and legitimacy. As discussed earlier, the role of a free press and the military's interaction with it adds a particular salient point for democratic societies.

### **3. On the Need of Carrots and the Human Condition**

Even in understanding the limitations of force or sticks, strategy can rarely be accomplished with the military alone. A more complete or comprehensive understanding of national power demonstrates that the instruments complement each other. Even in a time of war, all the instruments of power are operational, each being utilized to help achieve national strategic aims.

Sun Tzu spoke of giving your enemy a "golden bridge" lest cornered he turns and fights to the death. Israel had a great problem with understanding the Palestinians need for equality and dignity. When as a segment of society they felt they had no hope and nothing to lose, violence erupted. This lesson helps to see why diplomatic means are necessary when dealing with human beings and society. Some compromises and

concessions must generally be made in a representative society unless the role of warden is taken on forever. I am not implying that the Palestinian-Israeli issue could be easily solved, only that in order to address such an uprising, there needs to be the carrot in the strategy as well as the stick.

#### **4. On the Myths of Modern Warfare**

One of the prevailing myths of modern war is that there is the likelihood of a quick, decisive victory. In fact, this seems to be the exception rather than the rule. The IDF seemed to believe in its own invincibility which may closely resemble the attitude of today's U.S. military. An overconfident attitude may spell disaster for those armed forces who have not adequately analyzed the situation and who have underestimated their enemy.

This myth is closely related to the second one, the myth of technology. The IDF, like the United States military today, was a modern technological force. However, technology, although not without its uses, loses some capability in certain environments.

The major trends that we see in technology for enhanced warfighting capabilities are increased weapons ranges, increased lethality, digital processing and miniaturization of components. However, long range precision missiles, information technologies, or *any* technological enhancement, whether a new plane or submarine, is not by itself, a master key unlocking the solution to victory in future war, especially if the enemy is difficult to define or understand. "Focusing primarily on technology also entails great risks. The never ending search for elusive silver bullet weaponry ignores the fact that once any

military technology is known to exist and its characteristics are understood, it is possible to devise countermeasures that will reduce or completely negate its effectiveness.”<sup>163</sup>

There are even dangers of being susceptible to our own technology.<sup>164</sup>

In addition to a lack of historical perspective that countermeasures closely follow technological advancement, over reliance on technology may convince decision makers to move away from sufficient conventional forces necessary to project strategic landpower in a global environment. Will our future opponents be high technological forces, and if not, will a high technology approach work across the spectrum of military operations? That question remains unanswered. The lesson here is that technology can not solve all military problems, not for the IDF facing the Intifada and not for the U.S. military of tomorrow. In particular the strategy articulated in *JV2010* in its overall goal of being able to “leverage technological opportunities to achieve new levels of effectiveness in joint warfighting”<sup>165</sup> is still in question across the full spectrum of conflict.

Be that as it may, western democracies, particularly the United States, will likely continue to pursue military superiority from a decidedly technological bent, for a variety of reasons. For one, we have the monetary resources to do so, and technology tends to be one of our nation’s perceived international advantages. In addition, our nation’s history tells of a lengthy romance with technological means, even to the extent that some writers have referred to America having an “abiding love affair with the machine,”<sup>166</sup> and an “attachment of much of their national and personal identity to technology.”<sup>167</sup>

## **5. On the need for Operational Integration**

As discussed earlier, this was one of the glaring deficiencies of the IDF's planning and interaction with civilian authorities. The concept of operational art is necessary in modern war — I argue even in OOTW/SASO. The gains that are manifest in its proper use include a more complete synchronization or orchestration amongst the various instruments of national power, which in turn produce a greater depth of strategic and operational adaptability and flexibility.

## **V. Conclusions**

The U.S. military should continue to look closely at unconventional war and the difficulty in waging it. Our doctrine is not as robust on the lower end of the conflict spectrum as it is in conventional war. Perhaps that is as it should be, but the trends point to a growing probability of U.S. involvement in unconventional war against asymmetrical threats. Theory concerning asymmetry in warfare is only now emerging. This should continue to be a focus of theorists and doctrine writers in the next several years, especially as we continue to out distance our potential foes in technological capability.

The difficulty of unraveling the dynamic tensions in the Middle East are as difficult as unraveling the fabled Gordian Knot. It may indeed take the wisdom of Solomon or an Alexander, to cut away the entangled problems that this portion of the world represents. Attempting to understand the IDF's dealings with the Intifada uprising is not an effort to lay blame on what Israel could have done differently, but an effort to see ourselves in the

mirror of tomorrow. Bismark is reputed to have said that only a fool learns from experience because the wise learn from the experience of others. The struggle between Israel and the Palestinians during the uprising is a lens whereby we can learn from the experience of others.

The Intifada speaks of the tears, the sweat and the passion of both Israel's and the Palestinians' perilous and tenuous struggle for peace in an ancient land soaked with blood. Perhaps the tragic spilling of Abraham's blood can contribute to our understanding of the difficult application of military force in a non-combat environment.

## ENDNOTES

1 *The Holy Bible, "Genesis" & "First Chronicles,"* King James Translation, (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1967), 37, 459-460.

2 Thomas L. Friedman, *From Beirut to Jerusalem*, (New York, NY: Anchor Books, Doubleday, 1989), 390. An excellent overview to the modern issues between Israel, the PLO, Lebanon and the Palestinians.

3 For overviews of the historic nature of the larger background on the Arab-Israeli conflict see particularly the following sources:

David K. Shipler, *Arab and Jew, Wounded Spirits in a Promised Land*, (New York, NY: Penguin Books, 1986);

Meron Benvenisti, *Intimate Enemies, Jews and Arabs in a Shared Land*, (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1995);

Jimmy Carter, *The Blood of Abraham*, (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1985) - this book has a decent timeline overview of the conflict from ancient to modern day and several good maps to include the 1947 UN Palestine Partition Plan, and Israel both pre and post 1967;

Michael J. Cohen, *The Origins and Evolution of the Arab Zionist Conflict*, (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1987);

David Smith, *Prisoners of God, The Modern-day Conflict of Arab and Jew*, (London, England: Quartet Books Ltd., 1987).

4 Bible, "Hosea," 924.

5 Sources on the history of the PLO are numerous. See for example Bard E. O'Neill, *The Intifada in the Context of Armed Struggle*, in Robert O. Freedman, ed., *The Intifada, Its Impact on Israel, the Arab World, and the Superpowers*, (Miami, FL: Florida International University Press, 1991), 38-40. The following concise overview is provided by The Concise Columbia Encyclopedia by Columbia University Press, 1995.

*The Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO)*: the official representative council for Palestine refugee groups, recognized (1974) by the UN and the Arab states as the government of the Palestinians. Founded in 1964, it has been dominated by the Al Fatah guerrilla group of Yasir Arafat. The PLO regarded Israel as an illegal country and committed itself to establishing a Palestinian state, using guerrilla and terrorist attacks to achieve its goal. In 1982 the PLO was weakened when, after the Israeli siege of Beirut, Lebanon, PLO guerrillas in West Beirut were dispersed to other Arab countries. In 1988 the PLO responded to the Palestinian uprising, or *intifada*, in the West Bank and Gaza Strip by proclaiming the establishment of an independent Palestinian state. The PLO also



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equivocally recognized Israel's right to exist and renounced terrorism. After Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990, the PLO sided with Iraq, alienating the Saudis and Persian Gulf states that had long funded it. In 1991, with PLO agreement, Palestinians participated in peace talks with Israel. Secret negotiations between the PLO and Israel led to mutual recognition (1993) and limited Palestinian self-rule in Jericho and the Gaza Strip (1994), which is to be extended to all Arab cities and villages in the West Bank (except East Jerusalem) in 1996 under a 1995 accord.

<sup>6</sup> Gaza and the West Bank figure prominently in the Intifada Uprising as primary centers of Israeli Palestinian populations, and nationalistic fervency. These overviews provided by *The Concise Columbia Encyclopedia* may prove useful for the reader needing additional background.

*Gaza Strip*: coastal region (1995 est. pop. 813,000), c.140 sq mi (370 sq km), on the Mediterranean Sea, adjoining Egypt and Israel. Densely populated and impoverished, it is mainly inhabited by Palestinian refugees; there is also a small minority of Israeli settlers. The strip was part of the British mandate for Palestine from 1917 to 1948, passed to Egyptian control in 1949, and has been occupied by Israel since the 1967 Arab-Israeli War. Autonomy for the region, promised by the Camp David accords (1978), has yet to be granted. The Palestinian uprising (*intifada*) began in Gaza in 1987. A 1993 accord between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) resulted in limited Palestinian self-rule in the area in mid-1994.

*West Bank*: territory between Israel and Jordan, located W of the Jordan R. and the Dead Sea (1995 est. pop. 1,320,000), c.2,165 sq mi (5,607 sq km), occupied by Israel since the Arab-Israeli War of 1967. Many Israelis refer to it as Judaea and Samaria. It includes the cities of Hebron, Jericho, and Nablus, and the Old City of Jerusalem. The north is fertile; the south largely barren. Olives, and citrus products are produced; small-scale industries manufacture cement and textiles. Inhabitants are mostly Muslim Arab Palestinians with about 120,000 Israeli Jewish settlers. After the partition of Palestine and the formation (1948) of Israel, the territory was annexed (1950) by Jordan. Following the 1967 war, the UN Security Council called for Israel's withdrawal from the West Bank. The Camp David accords (1978) incorporated plans for Arab self-rule in the region. A peaceful resolution, however, was impeded by the establishment of Israeli settlements in the area and by Israeli-PLO hostility (Arab states, including Jordan, recognized the Palestine Liberation Organization [PLO] as the sole representative of the West Bank Arabs in 1974). A 1993 accord between Israel and the PLO led to limited Palestinian self-rule in Jericho and the Gaza Strip in mid-1994. An "interim" agreement in 1995 called for the extension of self-rule to, and the withdrawal of most Israeli forces from, all Arab cities and villages in the West Bank (except East Jerusalem) in 1996.

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<sup>7</sup> Ibid. There have been five major regional conflicts in 1948–49, 1956, 1967, 1973–74, and 1978–82 between Israel and various Arab states collectively referred to as the *Arab-Israeli Wars*:

The 1948–49 war reflected the opposition of the Arab states to the formation of a Jewish state in what they considered Arab territories. Newly created Israel was invaded by forces from Egypt, Syria, Transjordan (later Jordan), Lebanon, and Iraq. A UN-sponsored truce was arranged, but fighting has broken out periodically since then over the basic issue of the existence of Israel.

In 1956 Israel, joined by France and Great Britain, attacked Egypt after that country had nationalized the Suez Canal. Intervention by the UN, supported by the United States and the Soviet Union, forced a cease-fire.

In 1967, in the Six-Day War, Israel responded to Egyptian provocation with air attacks and ground victories. The result was a humiliating defeat for Egypt, which lost control of the Sinai Peninsula. Jordan and Syria, which attacked Israel in support of Egypt, lost the West Bank and the Golan Heights, respectively.

In the “Yom Kippur” (Israel) or “Ramadan” (Arab) War of 1973–74, Egypt, Syria, and Iraq attacked Israel on the Jewish holy Day of Atonement, catching the Israelis off guard. Israel recouped and forced the Arab troops back from their initial gains, but at great cost to both sides. Again, a cease-fire stopped the fighting. Egypt and Israel later signed the Camp David accords.

In 1978 Palestinian guerrillas, from their base in Lebanon, launched an air raid on Israel; in retaliation, Israel sent troops into S Lebanon to occupy a strip 4–6 miles deep and thus protect Israel's border. Eventually a UN peace-keeping force was set up there, but occasional fighting continued. In 1982 Israel launched a massive attack to destroy all military bases of the Palestine Liberation Organization in S Lebanon. After a 10-week siege of the Muslim sector of West Beirut, a PLO stronghold, the Palestinians accepted a U.S. sponsored plan whereby the PLO guerrillas evacuated Beirut for several Arab countries. Israel withdrew from Lebanon in 1985 but continued to maintain a Lebanese-Christian-policed buffer zone north of its border.

For a one volume overview see, Chaim Herzog, *The Arab-Israeli Wars, War and Peace in the Middle East*, (New York, NY: Vintage Books, 1984).

<sup>8</sup> Friedman, 370. By the time of the Intifada, Friedman states that the Palestinians under Israeli occupation constitute a little under half of the 4 to 5 million Palestinians in the world.

<sup>9</sup> O'Neill, “The Intifada in the Context of Armed Struggle,” in Robert O. Freedman, ed., *The Intifada, Its Impact on Israel, the Arab World, and the Superpowers*, (Miami, FL: Florida International University Press, 1991), 39–40, 50.

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10 Ibid., 41.

11 Ibid., 40. Inspiration for this approach was particularly fostered by successes in Algeria, Vietnam and Cuba.

12 Ibid., 49.

13 Ibid., 48-49. In 1968 in reaction to a bus station bombing, Jewish civilians attacked Arabs in the terminal including incoming Arab passengers. Israeli newspapers denounced such actions as counterproductive and stated that those involved were "unwilling allies of Arab terrorists." Government leaders in recognition of the threat this imposed met with Arab representatives to deny such actions as policy and cracked down on similar acts such as trying and convicting Israeli policemen and IDF officers for Arab murders later in 1968.

14 Ibid.

15 Ruth M. Margolies, *"The Path to Mass Rebellion: A Study of the Tactics and Countertactics in the Israeli Occupied Territories,"* (Ph.D. diss. Tufts University, 1993), 16, 27, 29-30. Margolies cites Ted Gurr, *Why Men Rebel*, (NJ: Princeton University Press, 1970), 13, as the source of PRD theory. Gurr defines PRD as; "A perceived discrepancy between men's value expectations and their value capabilities. Value expectations are the goods and conditions of life to which people believe they are rightfully entitled. Value capabilities are the goods and conditions they think they are capable of attaining or maintaining given the social means available to them."

16 Michael Mandelbaum, *"Israel and the Occupied Territories: A Personal Report of the Uprising,"* In *Critical Issues 1988*, 4, (The Publications Office of The Council on Foreign Relations, New York, 1988), 12.

17 Margolies, 23, 29-30.

18 Friedman, 353.

19 Graham Fuller, Richard Haass, John Hanna, Martin Indyk, Robert Lieber, and Michael Mandelbaum, *"The Impact of the Uprising: Report of a Fact Finding Mission to Israel, Jordan, Egypt and the West Bank,"* (by The Washington Institute for Near East Policy's Presidential Study Group on U.S. Policy in the Middle East, Washington, D.C., 1988), 4.

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20 O'Neill, 53.

21 Richard A. Gabriel, *Operation Peace for Galilee, The Israeli-PLO War in Lebanon*, (New York, NY: Hill and Wang, 1984), 224.

22 O'Neill, 53

23 Fuller, et. all., xiii. For further reading on the general nature of the background leading up to the Intifada as well as areas that are beyond the scope of this monograph such as American and Soviet responses, economic consequences, the impact on various Israeli political parties, and numerous impacts on both Israeli and Palestinian societies (women, Islamic influence, etc.) see these two compilations of various essays on the larger scope of the Intifada issue:

Zachary Lockman, and Joel Beinin, eds., *Intifada, the Palestinian Uprising Against Israeli Occupation*, (New York, NY: I.B. Tauris, 1990), (this one is strongly pro-Palestinian in its viewpoints).

Robert O. Freedman, ed., *The Intifada, Its Impact on Israel, the Arab World, and the Superpowers*, (Miami, FL: Florida International University Press, 1991).

In addition, for a thorough background on the peace efforts before and during the Intifada (a little dealt with area of the overall issue, see Mordechai Bar-On, *In Pursuit of Peace, A History of the Israeli Peace Movement*, (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1996).

24 Friedman, 360.

25 Ibid., 366.

26 Ibid., 371.

27 Ibid., 372.

28 Ibid., 375.

29 Ibid. Note: Friedman here quotes the definition from the standard Hans Wehr *Dictionary of Modern Written Arabic*. 375

30 Ibid., 375

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31 Aryeh Shalev, *The Intifada, Causes and Effects*, (Boulder, CO: West View Press, 1991), 110.

32 Gabriel, 223.

33 Ibid., 218.

34 Friedman, 373, quoting an East Jerusalem Palestinian merchant being interviewed by *Moment* magazine about the origins of the Intifada.

35 Don Peretz, *Intifada, The Palestinian Uprising*, (Boulder, CO: West View Press, 1990), 201-203.

36 Ibid.

37 Friedman, 392.

38 Bible, "Psalms," 640-641.

39 Friedman, 385.

40 Ibid., 384.

41 Ibid.

42 Ibid.

43 Ibid., 385.

44 Mandelbaum, 7.

45 For a complete overview that does an excellent job of showing the role Palestinian leaflets played in the absence of overt leadership, the calling for Palestinian statehood, and the role played by both nationalist and religious factions in using leaflets calling for popular uprising and violence, and for shaping this information campaign, see Shaul Mishal, and Reuben Aharoni, *Speaking Stones, Communiques From the Intifada Underground*, (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1994).

46 Peretz, 36-37.

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47 Shalev, 43.

48 Fuller, 11.

49 *Bible*, "Isaiah," 722.

50 Mandelbaum, 14.

51 Friedman, 391.

52 Ibid.

53 Mandelbaum, 12.

54 Peretz, 35-36.

55 Mandelbaum, 16.

56 Colin Shindler, *Ploughshares Into Swords? Israelis and Jews in the Shadow of the Intifada*, (New York, NY: I.B. Tauris & Co. Ltd., 1991), 126.

57 Mandelbaum, 13.

58 Ibid., 15.

59 Fuller, 10.

60 Shalev, 163.

61 Peretz, 40.

62 Fuller, 8.

63 Mandelbaum, 13.

64 This "core" competency idea mirrors thoughts in the U.S. military and civilian-military sectors. Dr. Samuel Huntington for instance states that "the core purpose of a military force is fundamentally to kill people in the most efficient way possible — it is only for that reason and related purposes that [any] country maintains military forces."

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He goes on to state that the military should perform other functions, but that those other functions should not define the mission of the military. See his discussion in James R. Graham, ed., *Non-Combat Roles for the U.S. Military in the Post-Cold War Era*, (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1993), 12.

65 Peretz, 45.

66 Ibid.

67 Ibid.

68 Ibid.

69 Gabriel, 196. Good discussion of this point in his chapter on "The Lessons of War."

70 Ibid.

71 Peretz, 62.

72 Gabriel, 223

73 Ibid., 218.

74 Friedman, 391

75 Shalev, 100.

76 Peretz, 47. See also Peretz's discussion of the findings of highly respected groups such as the Boston based Physicians for Human Rights with experience of interpreting violence in more than twenty countries. They concluded that contrary to administrative assertions, the violence in terms of sheer numbers could not be considered deviations or aberrations, but was closer to being the norm. p. 49.

77 Shalev, 102-103.

78 Larry Cable, "Reinventing the Round Wheel: Insurgency, Counter-Insurgency and Peacekeeping post Cold War," (*Small Wars and Insurgencies*, Vol. 4, Number 2, Autumn 1993, 228-262), 258.

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79 Shalev, 104.

80 Ibid., 105.

81 Ibid., 107.

82 Ibid., 107-108.

83 Ibid., 109.

84 Ibid., 111.

85 Peretz, 59.

86 Ibid., 60.

87 Ibid.

88 Shalev, 115.

89 Peretz, 58.

90 Ibid., 67.

91 Ibid.

92 Shalev, 101.

93 Peretz, 63.

94 Shalev, 105.

95 Peretz, 65.

96 Ibid., 66.

97 Shalev, 106.

98 Peretz, 75. For example, Peretz cites one example of a former president of Tel Aviv University and a member of the Knesset calling for the government in 1986 to close all higher educational institutions in the territories.



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- 99 Ibid., 76.
- 100 Shalev, 113-114.
- 101 Peretz, 61.
- 102 Robert D. Heinl, Jr., ed., *Dictionary of Military and Naval Quotations*, (Annapolis, MD: United States Naval Institute, 1966), 140.
- 103 Shalev, 122.
- 104 Ibid.
- 105 Peretz, 78-79.
- 106 Friedman, 76-105. The author details the complete destruction of a Syrian village for political security reasons, and by methods unacceptable to representative democracies.
- 107 Shalev, 99.
- 108 Peretz, 48.
- 109 Ibid., 79.
- 110 Bar-On, 397.
- 111 Peretz, 49 See also Appendix 12, p. 231, of the signed statement released at a Jerusalem press conference by 161 Israeli army reservists refusing to take part in IDF occupational duty in the West Bank and Gaza territories.
- 112 Ibid. See also Shoshana Blum-Kulka, "Managing a Moral Dilemma: Israeli Soldiers in the Intifada," (*Armed Forces & Society*, Vol 21, Issue 1, Fall 1994), 45-69 for an additional study providing analysis of coping mechanisms used by IDF members who continued to participate in acts of suppression and in some cases brutality. Interviews detailed mental constructs that supported the concept of balancing or attempting to reduce mental dissonance in a clash of held values as derived and supported from Cognitive Dissonance Theory.
- 113 Peretz, 77.

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114 Ibid. It should also be noted that other accounts cite only 8,500 wounded in the first two years (*by the IDF*), instead of the 20,000 listed here in the first year. See for example, Mordechai Bar-On, *In Pursuit of Peace, A History of the Israeli Peace Movement*, (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1996), 221. One explanation of this may be that the Israelis are not the only perpetrators of violence against the Palestinians during the Intifada. See for example Judith Miller, *God has Ninety-Nine Names, Reporting from a Militant Middle East*, (New York, NY: A Touchstone Book, Simon & Schuster, 1996), 345, for a description of Palestinians killing fellow Palestinians for the sake of political purity. She cites one source claiming that by the end of 1992, black-hooded gangs of Palestinians murdered hundreds of fellow Palestinians and the total number killed was nearly half the total killed by the IDF during the first five years of the uprising.

115 Ibid. This figure takes into account the additional impact upon Israel's economy.

116 Ibid., 71-73.

117 F. Robert Hunter, *The Palestinian Uprising, A War By Other Means*, (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1991), 182.

118 Friedman, 495.

119 See for instance Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., "The Origins of the American Military Coup of 2012," *Parameters*, Vol. XXII, No. 4 (Winter 1992-93), 12-13, which points out several sources and states, "Few seemed to appreciate the fundamental difference between the police profession and the profession of arms. As Richard J. Barnett observed in the New Yorker: 'The line between police action and a military operation is real. Police derive their power from their acceptance as 'officers of the law,' legitimate authority, not firepower, is the essential element....' Police organizations are understandably oriented toward the studied restraint necessary for the end sought: a judicial conviction. As one Drug Enforcement Administration agent noted: 'the military can kill people better than we can [but] when we go to a jungle lab, we're not there to move onto the target by fire and maneuver to destroy the enemy. We're there to arrest suspects and seize evidence.' If military forces are inculcated with the same spirit of restraint, combat performance is threatened. Law enforcement is also not just a form of 'low intensity conflict.' In low intensity conflict the military aim is to win the will of the people, a virtually impossible task with criminals 'motivated by money, not ideology.'"

120 Fuller, 8.

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- 121 Margolies, 200.
- 122 Heinl, 69.
- 123 Mandelbaum, 10.
- 124 Ibid., 9.
- 125 Fuller, 13.
- 126 Mandelbaum, 9.
- 127 Friedman, 384.
- 128 Ibid., 479. Cited from a serious editorial by a prominent American Jewish entertainer on 28 Jan 88.
- 129 Ibid., 444.
- 130 Mandelbaum, 10.
- 131 Shoshana Blum-Kulka, "Managing a Moral Dilemma: Israeli Soldiers in the Intifada," (*Armed Forces & Society*, Vol 21, Issue 1, Fall 1994), 45-69. Overall the impact of public influence over foreign policy in democracies is limited. The article points out that any such influence is indirect, dependent upon society values (like Israeli survival) and is usually multi-directional between the public and political leadership.
- 132 Bible, "Isaiah," 723.
- 133 Peretz, 78.
- 134 Bar-On, 240.
- 135 Peretz, 78.
- 136 See Shindler, 112 for a 1989 index of negative attitudes towards Israeli policy on the Intifada which shows a rough average of one third against Israeli policy split by age, religious Jewish background, education and political leanings.
- 137 Peretz, 80.

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138 Judith Miller, *God has Ninety-Nine Names, Reporting from a Militant Middle East*, (New York, NY: A Touchstone Book, Simon & Schuster, 1996), 346, 386-391.

139 Bar-On, 299.

140 For viewpoints on possible solutions to the Israeli-Palestinian problem or speculation on possible future scenarios specifically the possibility of a second Intifada, see chapter six, "Case One: The Peace Process Fails and a New 'Intifada' Takes Place," in Anthony H. Cordesman, *Perilous Prospects, The Peace Process and the Arab-Israeli Military Balance*, (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996), 108-153;

For other possible scenarios such as Palestinian autonomy, Israeli annexation, Palestinian Statehood, or Israeli unilateral withdrawal from Gaza, see Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, (JCSS) Study Group, *The West Bank and Gaza: Israel's Options for Peace*, (Tel Aviv, Israel: Jerusalem Post Press, 1989).

For a Palestinian-Israeli debate that centers on the possible options concerning borders, refugees, settlements, water and Jerusalem leading up to a two state solution see Mark A. Heller and Sari Nusseibeh, *No Trumpets, No Drums, A Two-State Settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict*, (New York, NY: Hill and Wang, 1991).

141 On 13 September 1993, amidst the famous handshake between Rabin and Arafat, Israel and the PLO exchanged letters of mutual recognition and signed the Declaration of Principles which formed the basis of the ongoing peace process.

142 Bible, "The First Epistle to the Corinthians," 1245.

143 Heintz, 340.

144 *Strategic Assessment, Flash Points and Force Structure*, 1997, Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1997, 233.

145 Steven Metz, "STRATEGIC HORIZONS: The Military Implications of Alternative Futures," (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 1997), vi - viii, 1-52.

146 Colin Clark, "Major Force Structure Cuts Loom, Says Top Army Official," *Defense Week*, 14 April 1997, 1.

147 George C. Wilson, "Challenging the Conventional Wisdom," *Air Force Times*, Vol 57, Issue 36, 07 May 1997, 28.

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148 James Stavridis, "The Second Revolution," *Joint Force Quarterly*, Spring 1997, 13. For a very eye opening account of how a weaker force could use asymmetrical means to defeat a future U.S. military force see Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., "How We Lost the High-Tech War of 2007 - A Warning From the Future," *The Weekly Standard*, 29 January 1996, 22-28.

149 *A National Security Strategy for a New Century*, May 1997, (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1997), 5-6.

150 *Ibid.*, 12.

151 *Ibid.*

152 *National Military Strategy of the United States of America, Shape, Respond, Prepare Now: A Military Strategy for a New Era*, 1997, (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1997), 9-16.

153 *Field Manual 100-5, Operations*, (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 14 June 1993), Glossary-6.

154 *Ibid.*

155 *Field Manual 100-7, Decisive Force: The Army in Theater Operations*, Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 31 May 1995, glossary-16,  
*Joint Publication 3-0*, Washington, DC: Department of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1 February 1995, GL-10.

156 *Ibid.*, (JP 3-0).

157 *Ibid.*, JP 3-0, Chapter V, "Military Operations Other Than War," V-2 - V-4. See also Army Field Manuals 100-19 *Domestic Support Operations*, 100-23 *Peace Operations*, and 100-23-1 *Humanitarian Assistance*.

158 David Grange, and John Rovegno, "*Shaping the Environment*," (Unpublished Manuscript, 1st Infantry Division Hqs, 1997), 4.

159 Grange, 5.

160 Cable, 258.

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161 Ibid., 259. "The military must educate its civilian superiors not only as to what it can do, but also, and, more importantly, in what it cannot do."

162 Ibid., 230.

163 Hirsh Goodman and W. Seth Carus, *The Future Battlefield and the Arab-Israeli Conflict*, (London: Transaction Publishers, 1990), 167; quoted in Douglas Macgregor, *Breaking the Phalanx*, (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1997), 3, n. 6.

164 See for example Dunlap, "How We Lost the High-Tech War of 2007 - A Warning From the Future," *The Weekly Standard*, 29 January 1996, 22-28.

165 *Joint Vision 2010*, (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1996), 1.

166 See specifically, Michael L. Smith's article, "Recourse of Empire: Landscapes of Progress in Technological America," in Merritt R. Smith, & Leo Marx, eds. *Does Technology Drive History?* (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1994), (37)-52. For a look at current American writing on possible future technologies' cultural impacts and interactions, see Kevin Kelly, *Out of Control*, (New York, NY: Addison-Wesley Publishing Co., 1994).

167 Ibid., 37-52

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Note: The Maps in Appendix A are taken from Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, (JCSS) Study Group, *The West Bank and Gaza: Israel's Options for Peace*, (Tel Aviv, Israel: Jerusalem Post Press, 1989), 195-198.

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
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
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
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





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